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For many Oregonians, there is a sharp dichotomy between personal freedom and 
government-imposed land use regulations.  Proponents of Measure 37, which acts to 
relieve landowners from the burden of regulation, would contend that the initiative allows 
landowners to regain rights lost decades ago.  Opponents would contend that regulation is 
needed to preserve Oregon’s natural resources from being completely developed.  In 
reality, the line separating the two sides is not so clear.  It is Measure 37, a radical and 
poorly written privately-sponsored initiative, which has exacerbated the separation of 
these two interconnected schools-of-thought.  After all, personal freedom is hindered by 
regulation because it limits choices, but a lack of regulation can lead down the same path. 
 This thesis empirically estimates the effect many social and environmental 
attributes, modifiable through Measure 37, have on sales prices in the Portland 
Metropolitan area.  It finds that zoning changes can significantly decrease the sale price 
of neighboring properties.  This suggests that this initiative is not a healthy direction for 
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PART 1: THE RHETORIC OF MEASURE 37 
 
I. A NEW INITIATIVE 
 On November 2, 2004 Oregon Ballot Measure 37 was approved by 61 percent of 
the voters in Oregon.  Nationally, Oregon had been known for its progressive land and 
zoning regulations, yet voters suddenly decided to turn those regulations inside-out.  
Measure 37 instantly softened a land-use system that was once cited as rigid and 
unwelcoming by developers and an environmentalist’s dream by others.  In the past, strict 
urban growth boundaries around cities had kept many landowners from selling their farm 
or forest land to developers or building structures of their own.  However, these same 
boundaries have kept acres of forest and streams from being paved over.   
 Measure 37, ultimately, commands that individual landowners must be 
compensated for reductions in the value of their property due to land-use regulations or 
zoning laws such as urban growth boundaries that place limits on allowable density.  
Proponents of the measure touted the idea of fairness; that there exists a constitutional 
mandate that owners must enjoy full property rights or else be compensated for their 
troubles.  Oregon must reverse its view that “although a society at large might benefit 
from the regulation, society is not required ‘to share the cost of the benefit…Instead, the 
accident of ownership determines who shall bear the cost initially.’”1  Opponents pushed 
the idea that regulations have brought the benefits which we enjoy in Oregon today; that 
pristine coastal areas, farmlands and forests have been preserved through careful planning 
mechanisms from which all Oregonians derive benefit.  In many cases, preservation of 
                                                 
1 Gieseler, Steven, Lewallen, Leslie, and Sandefur, Timothy.  “Measure 37:  Paying People for what We 
Take.”  Environmental Law.  Lewis and Clark Law School, Volume 36, Issue 1.  Pg 83. 
2 
these environmental attributes raises the land value for all, even those affected by 
regulation.  One landowner can restrict the liberties of a neighbor through adverse uses of 
their lands and furthermore, in the basest of arguments, “why should the public owe to a 
landowner [unregulated] rights that it does not owe to a stockholder or businessman?”2 
The compensable amount mentioned earlier must be the difference between the 
“fair market value” of the property in question with the offending regulation and 
without.3  Someone can claim that their land is worth less because a regulation takes 
away its potential for development, for instance.  Claimants can have an appraiser 
determine the value of their land if it had a development on it by looking at similar pieces 
of land with similar developments and then extrapolating that development to the 
claimant’s location.  Therefore, the value of the land under a hypothetical development 
must be determined.  The value of the land under this circumstance will be hypothetical 
because we can only observe it with the present regulation intact when making this value 
determination.  Measure 37 demands that claimants receive the difference between the 
current land value and this unobserved land value. 
The compensation award must come from the tax and general funds of the 
governing body that enacted the legislation, which are usually state and county 
governments.  If the governing body can not or will not pay the claimed lost property 
value, then the governing body must “modify, remove, or not apply the land-use 
regulation or land-use regulations to allow the owner to use the property for a use 
permitted at the time the owner acquired the property.”4  The third action—not applying 
                                                 
2 Sullivan, Edward.  “Year Zero:  The Aftermath of Measure 37.”  Environmental Law.  Lewis and Clark 
Law School, Volume 36, Issue 1.  Pg. 139. 
3 Ballot Measure 37, full text, Section (2). 
4 Ibid. Section (8) 
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the regulation—is generally interpreted as pertaining to a certain landowner and a certain 
property.  “The regulation is still in force; however the owner is permitted to undertake a 
use inconsistent with the regulation.”5 
Furthermore, the measure states that anyone who has maintained ownership of a 
piece of land both before and after a regulation has been enacted has the right to file a 
Measure 37 claim.  This right is extended to any land regulation that has occurred in the 
past as well as the future.  Land that has stayed within a single family, regardless of who 
the current owner is, also qualifies for a claim.  Therefore, regulations that have been in 
effect for decades can suddenly be overturned and people can demand compensation for 
years of lost development potential.  The retroactive nature of the measure will 
potentially create many more claimants with much larger compensation requests 
compared to similar yet proactive compensation systems in Florida and Texas.  No other 
measure or law has ever been passed in the U.S. which gives compensation retroactively 
for regulations enacted in the past. 
The effects of the measure thus far can be underscored by looking at some 
statistics regarding claims.  As of October 28, 2005, a total of 1,264 claims had been 
received by the State of Oregon.  Of these, 317 concluded with regulation waivers and 
only 32 were denied.  The rest were still either being processed or litigated.  By April 27, 
2006, the claim total had only climbed to 1,605 with 454 final determinations; no 
compensation had been awarded by this time.  This small gain is due to a period of 
suspended claims processing while the Oregon Circuit and Supreme Courts worked out 
the measure’s constitutionality.  The story most pertinent to this thesis, however, 
                                                 
5 Maukonen, Jona.  “Transferring Measure 37 Waivers.”  Environmental Law.  Lewis and Clark Law 
School, Volume 36, Issue 1.  Pg 181. 
4 
concerns the amount of land value that these 1,605 claimants perceive has been lost.  In 
aggregate, monetary awards of $3.2 billion dollars have been requested, averaging $1.9 
million dollars a claim.  Likewise, this amount is 2.5% of Oregon’s 2004 gross state 
product.6   
Due to the large awards demanded by claimants and the budget shortfalls within 
the state government and coupled with the fact that “a claimant need only establish on the 
balance of probabilities that there has been some reduction in the fair market value of the 
subject property in order to obtain a waiver,”7 there is little possibility that any claims 
will be settled through means of monetary compensation.  Opponents believe that the 
measure’s lasting impact will be felt in this domain.  The waivers will create a patchwork 
of conflicting land uses whereby once protected land and its neighbors will be subjected 
to increased pollution, noise and traffic. 
On the other hand, some believe that the greatest impact of Measure 37 may be 
felt years in the future when Oregon’s planners and local governments begin to approach 
land-use planning in a different light.  One commentator believes that there will develop 
an “unwillingness of the state or local governments to adopt regulations that might be the 
source of future Measure 37 claims.”8  Planners’ work may be stifled and local 
governments may end a periodic review process that amends and implements local 
regulations.  He labels this condition, “land-use sclerosis,” using a medical term that 
invokes the idea of paralysis.  Proponents of the measure would counter that this is a 
                                                 
6 These statistics originate from the Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development.  See: 
http://www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/measure37.shtml#Summary_of_Claims_Filed_with_the_State. 
7 Sullivan.  Pg. 143.  Emphasis belongs to the author.  
8 Ibid, Pg. 157. 
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beneficial impact; the government will carefully consider how regulations impinge on 
private property rights and plan accordingly. 
 Since this measure was introduced, its legality and fairness have been hotly 
debated.  The exact meaning and definition of clauses within the measure have been 
interpreted and reinterpreted.  Interpretation of the measure has differed even among 
various county governments.  Overall, opponents believe that the measure will strip away 
the planning and environmental protections that have made Oregon the scenic state that it 
is today, as well as waste millions of taxpayer dollars.  Proponents believe that this 
measure will restore individual property rights and curb out-of-control government 
restrictions.   
The following thesis will illuminate the current debate over Measure 37 as well as 
point to flaws written into the initiative.  Ultimately, I hope that this project provides both 
rhetorical and empirical evidence to support the idea that Measure 37, as written is vague, 
unfair and does not adequately incorporate proven economic principles.  It will be 
assumed, however, that Oregonians wish to improve and amend the former land-use 
scheme based upon their voting behavior.  This revealed desire will not be dismissed.  
Therefore, this thesis will not argue for the previous system to remain static but rather 
formulate solid arguments against the familiar “fairness” rhetoric of Measure 37.  Ideas 
and analysis advanced in this thesis will be relevant as opponents and proponents of land 
regulation continue the debate over the merits of the measure in both the public forum 
and possibly again at the ballot box in the future. 
This thesis will begin with a rhetorical discussion of Measure 37 and land 
regulation in general.  The Section II will highlight land regulation in the U.S. 
6 
Constitution and legal precedents that have formerly been set.  Then, the discussion will 
shift to the history of regulation in Oregon and how the measure may affect the future.  
The Section IV will compare the measure to other states’ land-use systems.  Compared 
with states that are known for less restrictive regulation, Measure 37 pushes the envelope 
even further.  It expands both the potential base of qualified claimants as well as the 
amount of damages each can claim.  The initiative accomplishes this through wording 
that does not sufficiently honor or interpret economic principles, an argument that will be 
developed in Section V.  Succinctly put, claimants are given the opportunity to measure 
not the lost value resulting from a regulation, but the net gain they would receive if the 
regulation were waived for them.  These are two different concepts and likely, values. 
Part 2 of the thesis will be an empirical analysis of Measure 37.  It will test the 
economic arguments in Section V of Part 1 using data from three counties that comprise 
the Portland, Oregon metropolitan area.  The Section VII will describe the data and 
display some of their summary statistics.  Section VIII advances a thorough methodology 
behind the derivation of the data and hypothesizes their significance.  Section IX will 
analyze the data using statistical techniques and draw inferences from output tables.  In 
its basest form, Part 2 will examine how sales prices and land values are affected by 
changes in land regulations and apply this analysis to determine the true loss that 
Measure 37 claimants should be claiming.  While this thesis recognizes that determining 
“fair” compensable amounts is difficult under any circumstance, it will surely indicate 




II. THE LAW OF LAND REGULATION 
 The legal precedent behind the government’s ability to regulate and enforce rules 
upon private property is laid out in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution which states 
that “private land shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”  The 
government is justified in seizing public land for a specific reason in so-called “takings 
cases” which determine monetary awards on a case by case basis.  In fact, in many states, 
a precedent has been set whereby a court rules that a taking has occurred after 
determining “whether the ends and means of [the] legislation were appropriate and 
whether or not the legislation was ‘unduly oppressive’ to regulated parties.”9  Each state 
court decides at what point a regulation has become “unduly oppressive” and 
compensation is owed.   
 The point at which a regulation crosses the line and becomes “oppressive” has 
been greatly debated.  Prior court rulings have used a number of inquiries to make this 
decision, including the estimated economic impact on the landowner, the extent that the 
claimant’s future investment decisions have been interfered with and the specific 
character of the government regulation.  The inquiry into the character of the action 
usually pertains to how much of the property is physically occupied by the public.10  
Oregon, on the other hand, has traditionally used another method known as the 
“economically viable use rule” to determine when a taking has occurred.  This Fifth 
Amendment interpretation essentially states that if the regulation “allows a landowner 
                                                 
9 Sullivan, Edward.  “A Brief History of Takings Clause.”  Handout, August 2005. 
10 Gieseler, Lewallen, and Sandefur.  Pg. 88. 
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some substantial beneficial use of his property, the landowner is not deprived of his 
property nor is his property ‘taken.’”11 
The compensation required when a land-use regulation devalues one’s property as 
stipulated by Measure 37 is related to the issues present in classic takings cases, however 
there are significant differences.  In a traditional takings case, it is ruled that a taking has 
occurred when the government takes one hundred percent ownership of the property.  
Once the government takes the land, it is constitutionally required to compensate the 
owner for the “fair market price” of the land as determined by an appraiser.  
Compensation under takings is prospective.  Owners are reimbursed for any damages 
they occur the day of the taking as well as lost income that the land could have generated 
in the future.   
Under Measure 37, Oregon is now required to compensate landowners not only if 
their land is taken due to a government seizure, but also if it is devalued by any amount 
through a zoning ordinance.  Therefore, for the first time in Oregon, devaluation less than 
one hundred percent that occurred in the past or may occur in the future is grounds for 
compensation.  Also, for the first time in the United States, the government is not granted 
ownership of property for which it must pay either partial or full “fair market value.”  
Like takings cases, owners are given compensation for lost income that the land could 
have provided in the future.  However, owners maintain ownership of this land as well as 




                                                 
11 Ibid.  Pg. 90. 
9 
III. HISTORY 
 It is obvious why the issues regarding the implementation of Measure 37 have 
been such hotly debated topics in Oregon for the past year.  No system has ever been 
created anywhere to consistently and fairly measure lost property value due to regulation.  
No one has figured out how to value land if it had always had full development potential.  
This would be the “fair market value” of the land had no regulation ever been enforced.  
Furthermore, there is no specific fund from which to pull money for compensation.  Due 
to the lack of ability to pay compensation, people (especially farmers), are concerned that 
their neighbors will be granted permission to build a subdivision next door.   
This begs the question: Was Oregon’s former land use system so horrible that 
such an egregious overhaul was necessary?  The answer to this question usually depends 
on how much right an individual believes the government has to restrict landowners’ 
freedoms to use their property in any way they see fit.  The former system, known as 
Senate Bill 100, began in 1973 when former Governor Tom McCall signed it into law.  
This plan established “urban growth boundaries” (UGB) which were supposed to protect 
Oregon from “sagebrush subdivisions, coastal condo-mania, and the ravenous rampage of 
suburbia in the Willamette Valley,” in Governor McCall’s words.  Up until Measure 37 
was passed, this system was considered the most rigid in the country.  Property owners 
outside of urban growth boundaries could rarely use their land for development.  Of 
course, these boundaries have expanded with an increasing population.  Increasingly, 
critics argued that this system contributed to “increased congestion, higher housing costs, 
shrinking lot sizes, and too many restrictions.”12 
                                                 
12 Oliver, Gordon.  “Oregon on the Cusp.” Planning.  The American Planning Association, October 2004. 
10 
 No matter the criticism, Senate Bill 100 remained almost entirely unchanged for 
thirty years.  One commentator paints a backdrop of American history into its inception 
and longevity.  The early Seventies were a time of political and social reform 
encapsulated by the “fight for open government against the Nixon administration [its 
Watergate scandal, abuse of power] and the Vietnam War and concern for the 
environment that made many political things new.”13  Sullivan further states that Senate 
Bill 100 was a manifestation of that reform.  People were swept up in becoming part of 
the political process; new public records laws helped facilitate this.  Just after the bill was 
passed, ten thousand people attended land-use planning workshops and another one 
hundred thousand were on the mailing list of the Land Conservation and Development 
Commission, an agency set up to administer Oregon’s planning program.14  Considering 
that the population of Oregon was two million at the time, there was great public input. 
 With the passage of Senate Bill 100, a number of statewide planning goals were 
adopted.  Furthermore, individual pieces of land were zoned by local governments to 
conform to these goals.  While numerous, the most important of these goals call for the 
conservation of natural resources, creation of an efficient transition from urban to rural 
land and the involvement of citizens in the planning process. 
 These goals defined where many people would stand in the debate over Measure 
37 decades later.  Many of those critical of the goals became outspoken supporters of the 
measure.  The goals, notably those aimed at the preservation of open space and 
containing urbanization were the embodiment of anti-growth aspirations.  All of the other 
                                                 
13 Sullivan.  Pg. 136. 
14 Stacey, Bob.  “Looking Large at Oregon’s Future.”  Handout from the public interest group, 1000 
Friends of Oregon. 
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goals were merely tools to realize those same aspirations.15  Furthermore, they have led to 
“no growth, which in turn has led to a stifled economy, reduced tax revenues and 
skyrocketing housing costs,” among other unnamed consequences.16  The most egregious 
effect of the goals, however, is the deprivation of property rights to landowners in the 
name of preserving environmental attributes.17 
 Opponents of Measure 37 believe that these goals coincide with consistent and 
intelligent planning and the consequences have not been as grave as some believe.  First 
of all, the goals do in fact advance Oregon’s economy by protecting some of the land that 
the state is dependent on.  For example, the economy was highly dependent on forestry 
when the goals were applied.  It is estimated that 22 percent of Oregon’s forests had been 
converted into developments when the system was put into place and since that time, the 
growth has been minimal.18  Furthermore, the ability for farmers to earn a profit has been 
potentially heightened by the goals because of the separation of residential developments 
from agricultural areas which could cause many conflicts of interest.  The consequence 
could be compromises or rules that limit the noise emanating from the farm as well as the 
amount of spray used.  The waivers propagated by Measure 37 could have the impact of 
lost timber supply and an increased rift in urban-rural relations.19 
 Secondly, the goals represent a progressive knowledge of the effect developments 
have on air and water quality.  Over time, there were revisions made to the zoning 
regulations so that land-uses continued to conform to the goals as population and demand 
                                                 
15 Gieseler, Lewallen, and Sandefur.  Pg. 92. 
16 Ibid.  Pg. 93. 
17 Ibid.  Pg. 92. 
18 Martin, Shelia.  “Documenting the Impact of Measure 37:  Selected Case Studies.”  Institute of Portland 
Metropolitan Studies, Portland State University.  January 2006.  Pg. 5. 
19 Ibid.  Pg. 5. 
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changed.  These revisions were made in the best interest of society in order to maintain 
high levels of environmental quality.  However, “by allowing claimants to use land-use 
laws in place decades ago, Measure 37 requires policy makers to ignore what we know 
today about how development affects these resources.”20 
 Thirdly, opponents of the goals could make a case could be made that housing 
will not become cheaper for low income residents.  However, most of the development 
proposed under Measure 37 is low density residential in rural areas which will not meet 
the needs of many citizens.  Those with low incomes will not be able to afford the costs 
associated with a larger lot size and commuting distance. 
 Proponents of Measure 37 would counter that people of every income level have 
had to deal with higher housing prices and little business growth due a constrained supply 
of land afforded by the UGB.  The UGB does essentially contain growth and public 
infrastructure within prescribed areas.  According to Metro, the government agency that 
maintains the UGB, however, it creates incentives to continue to re-develop and “keep 
downtowns in business.”21  Furthermore, a twenty year supply of land is kept within the 
UGB at all times for all uses so that the supply remains high enough to prevent large 
price increases.22 
 Finally, the goals of Senate Bill 100 made up a planning framework which all 
policy decisions were based on.  Measure 37 is not an amendment to this community-
wide policy system since it completely invalidates the goals for legitimate claimants, nor 
is it a framework in its own right.  Instead, the measure only gives consideration to an 
individual’s whims whereby “decisions about development are no longer based on facts 
                                                 
20 Ibid.  Pg. 6. 
21 See:  http://www.metro-region.org/article.cfm?articleID=277 
22 For a more in-depth discussion of the UGB, see the Hypothesis section of this thesis. 
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regarding the potential [economic, environmental] impacts of alternative courses of 
action.”23  Unlike the goals, Measure 37 does not account for the varying economies and 
environmental attributes found across Oregon. 
 After three decades of existence, the goals of Senate Bill 100 were bound to 
become out-dated.  Concerns that were addressed in other states remained unaddressed in 
Oregon.  For instance, “[Oregon] never adopted a land use program which identifies the 
farm or forest resource land which truly merits ‘conservation,’ it simply mandated that 
almost every rural acre be ‘preserved’ regardless of productivity…”24  This is a 
compelling argument; perhaps not all of Oregon’s lands are being put to their greatest 
economic use.  This is where both sides of the land-use divide could compromise.  On a 
case-by-case basis, it rural zoning regulations could be amended to allow a more efficient 
use of land yet attempt to keep the original goals and local community land-use standards 
in place. 
 Senate Bill 100 was a unique planning system when it was first introduced.  It was 
overwhelmingly supported by Oregonians for decades but eventually fell out of favor.  
Proponents of the system should have anticipated the need for revision.  Opponents of the 
system have not solved any problems by introducing Measure 37, which eliminates the 
goals of the former scheme yet is not a stand-alone framework.  Fortunately, a public 
study is being developed called the “Big Look” which will determine the effectiveness of 
the 1973 system and how the state’s priorities have shifted since then.  Hopefully, as 
many or more Oregonians will voice their opinion regarding the future of Oregon land-
use as they did during the Nixon era. 
                                                 
23 Martin.  Pg. 4. 
24 Gieseler, Lewallen, and Sandefur.  Pg. 91. 
14 
 
IV. A UNIQUE INITIATIVE 
Analyses of other states’ land use and zoning laws are an important base for 
understanding Measure 37 property rights issues.  In recent years, Florida has been a 
hotbed of controversy surrounding property rights and the regulation of land.  Early in the 
1990’s Florida passed a law that is similar to that of Measure 37 in a number of ways.  
Similar to Measure 37, this act is open to numerous interpretations, one being that any 
regulation that limits the freedoms of an owner to use their property is grounds for 
compensation.  Under this interpretation, the estimated transfer of wealth to land owners 
due to “inordinate burden” under these laws is 28 to 50 billion dollars. 25  Like Oregon, 
there are no state funds explicitly set aside for claims, so it is expected that much of the 
expense is passed onto taxpayers.  Furthermore, one could tacitly assume that much of 
the funds in both states will be transferred to an already wealthy landowner group.26 
This is an important area of interest because Oregon has yet to think of a “best” 
way to measure the reductions in land value in order to distribute compensation.  In the 
case of Florida, land use entities—those who enforce the land use laws—must provide 
the claimant with a “ripeness decision” that details whether the claimant’s proposed use 
of land is legal under the current laws, and what uses are allowable.  If the claimant 
decides that the ruled allowable uses impinge upon his or her proposed use of the 
property, or its value, the case is taken to court to determine what the proper 
compensation amount should be.  In theory, this method of filing claims should eliminate 
cases where no compensation is required and cut down on costly court time. 
                                                 
25 Vargas, Sylvia.  “Florida’s Property Rights Act:  A Political Quick Fix Results in a Mixed Bag of 
Tricks.”  Florida State University Law Journal, 1996.  Pg. 3. 
26 Ibid.  Pg. 3. 
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 Vargas asserts that Florida’s land use law was enacted in order to give landowners 
compensation for the “fair” value of property values taken from property owners when 
their land is “inordinately burdened.”  The definition of “inordinately burdened” is 
somewhat arbitrary, but is based on a landowner’s loss of use of part of their property, 
loss of the right to exclude others, and the loss of possible investment value the land may 
have had.  Also, the law is intended to “signal to local governments to use greater caution 
and common sense when enacting new land use regulations,” and among other things, 
“facilitate decentralized decision-making.”27 
 Invoking an earlier image, many people believe that instead of telling the 
government to be more sensible, these laws create land regulation paralysis.  It does not 
help that the government is at a disadvantage.  Individual landowners hold asymmetric 
information about their property which the land use regulatory entity must spend time 
and money researching.  Furthermore, these entities will become risk-adverse to the point 
that they settle early in the claims process for fear of having to pay lawyer fees and the 
requested compensation.28  In Oregon, this same fear has led to the quick waiver of many 
regulations and will likely result in a failure by the government to enact future regulations 
that may provide benefits to the public.29 
The Florida law was made without the intent of redistributing much income; 
however, there is nothing in the current scheme of the law to “satisfactorily mete out 
fairness.”  At a time when state funding is lacking, these land use laws cannot promise 
that compensation will not come from taxpayer’s pockets.  Therefore, the law does not 
protect the interests of the many against the one landowner.  Compensating one 
                                                 
27 Ibid.  Pg. 4. 
28 Ibid.  Pg. 4. 
29 Martin.  Pg. 4. 
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landowner will likely cost much more than the benefits it will bring to society as a whole.  
Like current problems in Oregon, Vargas finds fault with the lack of proper and full 
definitions of when land value has been taken from the owner.30 
Florida Attorney David Powell says that proper compensation is decided on a 
case-by-case basis and is determined by a judge who is solely responsible for determining 
whether the property has been “inordinately burdened” and ultimately decides on 
compensation by measuring the difference in the fair market value before and after the 
regulation.31  Appraisers on both sides of the argument decide on a land value.  If the 
government is forced to pay compensation, it then owns the land, due to the logic that by 
placing a certain regulation on it, it was in effect taking the land.  Oregon, on the other 
hand, allows property owners to retain rights to their land regardless of compensation. 
Another stipulation of Florida’s law is that a claimant can only receive 
compensation if they prove a given land-use regulation violates their “investment-backed 
expectations.”32  This restriction takes into account the fact that when people buy 
property, they buy that property with certain expectations of how it can be used in the 
present and the future.  Furthermore, “such a right must exist at the time the land is 
purchased and be supported by some sort of government acknowledgement, such as a 
statute.”33  Therefore, if a regulation is enacted which prevents these expectations from 
being realized, the owner can make a claim for compensation.  Similarly, if it is ruled that 
an owner could not have expected to use their property in a certain way, they cannot issue 
                                                 
30 Vargas.  Pg. 3. 
31 Powell, David.  “An Introduction to Florida’s Landmark Law Protecting Private Property Rights.”  
Hopping Green Sams & Smith, P.A.  Tallahassee, Florida. 
32 Vargas.  Pg. 12. 
33 Butts, Robert.  “Private Property Rights in Florida:  Is Legislation the Best Alternative?”  Journal of Land 
Use and Environmental Law.  Florida State University, 1997.  Pg. 6. 
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a claim.  For example, a rural landowner cannot make a claim because they are unable to 
build a subdivision or golf course.  Without a developed infrastructure built, including 
things such as adequate roads and utilities, there is no way this owner reasonably 
expected to build such a subdivision when he acquired the land.  The costs of developing 
such infrastructure would be too great for one landowner to overcome.  Measure 37, on 
the other hand, does not include such a stipulation.  This means that rural landowners 
could potentially claim for the ability to build a subdivision or receive the desired 
compensation, no matter the infrastructure available in their area.  There is no safeguard 
from those who claim that they have been prevented from building a subdivision, yet 
have no intention to do so due to the overpowering capital costs it would take to 
implement. 
 Texas’ law, however, is not quite as restrictive as Measure 37 in terms of how 
much land value can be reduced before compensation is owed.  The statute only 
considers distributing compensation for regulations that take more than 25% of a 
property’s value.  Again, the value of the land is measured before and after a certain 
regulation was put in place.  Currently, the Oregon legislature is proposing a bill that 
would adopt this policy.  Presumably, it has resulted in fewer claims, and Oregon is 
looking for limitations on how many claims are brought into the courts.   
Although Oregon’s new law is similar to both Florida and Texas’s policies, it 
goes above and beyond the other laws in ways that will surely increase the number of 
claims and compensable rulings.  The laws in Florida and Texas act proactively, only 
affecting land use that is enacted after the law’s passing.  In Oregon, the law works both 
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proactively and retroactively.34  This means that anyone who has owned a tract of land 
since the beginning of Oregon’s land use laws can file a claim.  Most likely, this signals a 
larger base of possible claims for Oregon than any other state.  Also, there is a 
requirement in all other states that the claimant provide notification to neighbors that 
there may be a waiver of regulations in their area.  This is sensible considering the fact 
that negative externalities may occur when a neighbor decides to develop his land.  
Oregon, however, has no requirements for public notification of possible waivers.  This 
fact alone has created a lot of controversy since the measure was enacted.  As we turn to 
the economic aspects of Measure 37, we find that many people’s fears regarding the 
negative impact of Measure 37 claims in their area are quite sensible. 
 
V. THE ECONOMICS BEHIND MEASURE 37 
Measure 37 as written is vague, unfair to all landowners and taxpayers alike and 
does not adequately incorporate proven economic principles.  By no means does this 
mean that Oregon’s land-use system was not due for a change.  Oregonians twice voted 
for systems to compensate aggrieved landowners (the first, Measure 7, was invalidated by 
the courts due to a legal technicality).  However, the writing of the current initiative 
allows qualified landowners to act like monopolists, offering compensation as if 
developers would have desired only their land in a free market without regulation.  This 
completely ignores the fact that had there been no regulation, these landowners would 
have been competing with their neighbor’s land in order to attract a developer.  In other 
words, it is possible that the regulation created the market for developable land in the 
                                                 
34 Barringer, Felicity.  “Property Rights Law May Alter Oregon Landscape.”  The New York Times, 
November 26, 2004. 
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claimant’s area and not the forces of time and population growth.  Also, the initiative 
does not take into consideration the effect that changing a claimant’s zone designation 
has on neighboring properties. 
Central to the latter argument is the assumption that land-use regulations result in 
both costs and benefits.  The only necessary requirement for a land-use regulation to exist 
is whether it passes “potential Pareto improvement.”  This economic principle states that 
those who benefit from a land-use regulation benefit enough from it that they could, in 
principle, compensate those who lose land value.  However, it is not a requirement that 
the “winners” compensate the “losers” because that would require a value judgment.  
This principle is just concerned with whether the benefits outweigh the costs in 
aggregate.  Measure 37, on the other hand, incorporates the “Pareto” principle which 
states that “winners” must compensate the “losers.”  Unfortunately, Measure 37 does not 
provide a feasible method for fairly compensating the “losers” while protecting the 
“winners” due to the negative impacts a high density development could have on a 
residential community as a whole.  It is possible that these negative impacts could 
outweigh the benefits provided the individual landowner.  In this case, Measure 37 would 
not pass the “potential Pareto improvement” principle.   
Interestingly, the land use system put in place by Senate Bill 100 has in some 
ways honored the “Pareto” principle.  Many pieces of farm and forest land are given tax 
breaks and subsidies in order to keep their operations profitable.  In fact, many of these 
same properties are now under Measure 37 claims.  Unfortunately, Measure 37 does not 
take this fact into account; even where “winners” have been compensating “losers,” 
claims are still allowable. 
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Usually, the community at large benefits from land-use regulations because 
individuals in residential areas can be assured that their neighbors will not build loud or 
polluting commercial and industrial enterprises.  However, some landowners face costs 
because they cannot build, say, a convenience store or an apartment building in their 
neighborhood and reap profits from these enterprises.  In some cases, however, 
regulations that keep amenities such as tree canopy and stream beds intact can cause a 
positive effect on the land value of all properties within a community.  Nonetheless, there 
is a need for zoning regulations to protect amenities that positively benefit everyone.  
Occasionally, some landowners prefer to use their land as they see fit while they believe 
that their neighbors will keep positive amenities.  Since the property of the owner who 
wants to exercise all freedoms to his land is close to positive amenities lying on 
surrounding properties, he still reaps the benefits.  He has the incentive to strive for the 
best of both worlds:  develop his land and hope his neighbors keep theirs undeveloped.  
Even in the case of positive amenities, there is a need for government regulation.   
Therefore, when determining the validity of a claim, a regulation’s benefit to the 
community could be determined.  If the cost of removing a regulation is greater to a 
community than the benefit of that exemption is to the single landowner, then claims 
could be invalidated by invoking the “potential Pareto improvement” theory.  This is a 
moral judgment.  We cannot legitimately force a successful businessman to give away his 
fortune back to society unless these gains were made possible by illegal coercion or 
public harm.  Similarly, only harmful uses of land should definitely be blocked under any 
circumstances, which Measure 37 does marginally take into consideration.  Uses that 
interfere with “public health and safety” are excluded but uses that harm “public 
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welfare,” a term that is usually linked with the other two in law, are not excluded.  This 
may limit the definition of uses that distinctly work against the public interest.35 
As one commentator puts it,  
The need to protect the public’s interest in private land is particularly vital 
because it goes to the heart of private property’s legitimacy…private 
property in land isn’t morally legitimate when it allows owners to harm 
the public good.  After all, why should we deploy our police and courts to 
support private action that harms the community?36 
 
Society gives the power of property ownership to individuals in the name of 
personal freedom.  Surely, the equality of personal freedom is a public good, meaning 
that it is beneficial to society.  So, we must decide what types of land uses are against the 
public good just as we must decide what types of regulation limit personal freedom too 
much.  Do zoning changes that result in excess noise, traffic and neighborly conflicts 
work against the community good sufficiently enough to invalidate claims?  What about 
those changes that bring down the value of neighboring properties by reducing positive 
amenities when the owners have no means of recourse?  Can’t we legitimately contend 
that such zoning changes can and do limit the personal freedoms of claimants’ neighbors?  
These rhetorical questions cannot be answered easily.  It may be prudent to evaluate each 
claim on a case by case basis.  There must be some point, however, when the wedge 
between societal costs and restoring a property’s “fair market value” is so greatly skewed 
in the individual’s favor that a Measure 37 claim should be invalidated. 
Furthermore, what is meant by “fair market value” if we must value what a 
property with a hypothetical development is worth in the market?  It is clear that the “fair 
market value” of any given piece of land with a regulation is the price that a 
                                                 
35 Sullivan.  Pg. 144. 
36 Freyfogle, Eric.  “Goodbye to the Public-Private Divide.”  Environmental Law.  Lewis and Clark Law 
School, Volume 36, Issue 1.  Pg 21. 
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knowledgeable buyer would pay a knowledgeable seller if neither were forcibly required 
to make the transaction.  As Plantinga points out, most running definitions of “fair market 
value” emphasize that it is the price that results in a competitive market.37  The real 
problem is deciding how much a buyer would pay a seller for a piece of land today if we 
pretend that land-use laws have been non-existent for the past thirty years.  
Unfortunately, Measure 37 wrongly assumes that only the claimant’s land is excluded 
from the thirty years of regulation while neighboring properties are bought and sold with 
regulations intact.  This is the monopolist argument alluded to above.  Plantinga calls his 
paradigm the “partial-general equilibrium.”  It is under the partial equilibrium that the 
landowner is a monopolist; only a partial exemption of zoning from the individual’s land 
is considered.  The general equilibrium implies that there is a complete invalidation of the 
zoning regulation from all properties. 
 The approach currently undertaken by local governments to determine the fair 
market loss due to a regulation implicitly treats the claimant like a monopolist.38  When a 
claim of market loss from a regulation is submitted, it considers the hypothetical value of 
a given property after its zoning is, for example, suddenly changed from agriculture to 
high density (developable) land.  This value is computed by an appraiser who looks at 
similar properties where development is already allowed and estimates the value of the 
claimant’s land if it could suddenly be sold to a developer.  However, the appraisal will 
be flawed because it assumes that the “harmful” land-use regulation will be lifted for the 
claimant’s property and none of its neighbors since it will be applied to an area where the 
                                                 
37 This argument originates with Andrew Plantinga, professor of economics at Oregon State University, in 
the unpublished article, “Measuring Compensation under Measure 37: An Economist’s Perspective,” 
12/9/04. Pg. 3. 
38 Ibid. Pg. 10. 
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regulation is fully enforced.  “These methods implicitly assume that a property identical 
to other properties that sold for price X, will also be worth X, no matter how many such 
properties were to be put on the market.”39  Thus, the appraisal will act as though 
claimant has a monopolist’s control of developable land in his immediate area.  Simple 
supply and demand dictates that an exclusive piece of developable land will command a 
larger demand and price.  Compensation must be measured as though the “harmful” 
regulation does not apply anywhere.  If the regulation had never been passed, then the 
claimant would never have had a uniquely developable piece of land so their losses in 
land value occurred in a competitive rather than monopolist market.  Competition drives 
down the demand and value of a given piece of developable land.   
 
Amenity Effects 
 One professor definitively states that while many people believe land-use 
regulations unambiguously lower property values, there are two ways which regulations 
can increase values.  First, there are “amenity effects,” alluded to above, which were 
discussed in terms of protecting or enhancing environmental attributes.  Perhaps a more 
tangible example is the property tax which helps fund many public services such as 
schools and in turn facilitates a prosperous community which raises property values 
through increased demand.40 
 The existence of an “amenity effect” was recognized by the Oregon Supreme 
Court in its February 21, 2006 ruling that Measure 37 is constitutional.  The ruling states: 
 
                                                 
39 Jaeger, William.  “The Effects of Land-Use Regulations on Property Values.”  Environmental Law.  
Lewis and Clark Law School, Volume 36, Issue 1.  Pg 108. 
40 Ibid.  Pg. 106. 
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Plaintiffs allege that Adams will suffer the following concrete harms 
stemming from his neighbor’s successful Measure 37 claim:  (1) 
diminished water quantity and quality available to Adam’s property; (2) 
increase traffic; (3) an increased tax burden due to increased enrollment in 
the local school system; and (4) increased pollution.  We conclude that 
plaintiffs’ allegations concerning Adams are sufficiently plausible and 
concrete to support standing.41 
 
Many of these effects are due to the loosening of environmental standards that a 
development would create.  This study agrees that such liberalization would lessen 
property values.  It would be hard, however, to determine whether the direct increase in 
tax burden in this instance would outweigh the probable indirect property value increase 
that Jaeger contends. 
From a rhetorical standpoint, we could ask if the exemption or loosening of 
environmental regulations due to Measure 37 is “fair” or socially moral.  After all, the 
neighbors of claimants based their “investment decisions on the legal framework in place 
at the time they purchased their properties.”42  This is rather ironic: by claiming it was 
unjust to have regulations interfere with their investment decisions, claimants are 
inflicting the exact same injustice upon their neighbors.  Again, rather than having a land 
use ordinance that effectively nullified the previous one for some owners, Oregonians 
needed to find an amended compromise to Senate Bill 100. 
 
Scarcity Effects 
 Secondly, there are “scarcity effects” in which regulations restrict the quantity of 
developable land in certain areas and therefore increased prices and demand follow.43  
                                                 
41 Oregon Judicial Department Appellate Court Opinions.  (CC No. 05C10444; SC S52875).  Found at:  
http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/S52875.htm.  Filed February 21, 2006. 
42 Martin.  Pg. 7. 
43 Jaeger.  Pg. 106. 
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This is why the compensation method that gives the claimant monopoly power is so 
problematic.  The reason that an individual may find himself sole owner of developable 
land in a given region could be due to the intervention of a regulation.  It is possible that 
the regulation has created a market for development on the claimant’s property where 
none existed before.  A supply shift due to regulation could also affect prices between 
regions.  The market price for land in unregulated regions should be higher than the price 
for regulated and un-developable land.  A wedge is created whereby the regulated and 
unregulated lands diverge in value when they once commanded the same price 
(considering all of their other attributes are similar).44 
 Inevitably, those people in the regulated region will look at land similar to theirs 
in unregulated areas and be envious, even furious, at the higher market values their 
neighbors are enjoying.  If they think as many Oregonians have, they will believe that the 
devaluation their land has suffered due to regulation is equal to the differential between 
their market prices and those of their neighbors.  This notion is incorrect due to supply 
shifts.  The true devaluation that the regulation has caused is equal to market price that all 
land in both regions would be receiving if the regulation had never existed.  By removing 
the ordinance from the regulated region, supply of developable land increases thereby 
decreasing prices in both regions.   
Note that it is likely, although not guaranteed, that the regulated land was 
devalued in the first place.  Regulations with “amenity effects” could increase all prices 
in the regulated region.  However, market values could increase even more in unregulated 
regions.  Some people may compare the two values and conclude that the regulation 
                                                 
44 Ibid.  Pg. 109. 
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devalued their land.  In reality, the regulation increased all land values but some more 
than others.45 
 Now, consider the lone claimant who gets a regulation exemption through 
Measure 37.  The market value of his land will skyrocket because it is uniquely 
developable in that region and the “scarcity effect” is taking place.  The true devaluation 
of the claimant’s property should be equal to the market price if no properties were 
regulated in the region.  This argument conforms with Plantinga’s rhetoric regarding the 
monopolistic treatment wrongly given to claimants. 
 The most important point is that it is always in the best interest of the individual 
landowner to get exempted from land-use regulations whether those regulations resulted 
in a real increase or decrease in the market value of their land.  Either way, the “scarcity 
effect” will cause the exempted property values to rise above non-exempted counterparts 
no matter if the owner had been truly wronged in the first place.  The direct consequence 
being, unfortunately, that many Oregonians believe that positive effects on land values 
due to regulation exemptions are proof that the regulation caused monetary harm.46  The 
fundamental flaw with this paradigm is that it leads people to “measure not the loss in 
value resulting from a given regulation, but the windfall gain that an exemption would 
bring them.”47 
However, the premium claimants will receive from this exemption is dependent 
on the continuing conformity of their neighbors.  This is sort of a “prisoner’s dilemma.”48  
                                                 
45 Ibid.  Pg. 114. 
46 Ibid.  Pg. 107. 
47 Sullivan.  Pg. 142.  Emphasis belongs to the author. 
48 The prisoners are better off as a community if no one “rats” on the others, but there could be significant 
gains to that one prisoner who decides to become a snitch.  Therefore, everyone has an incentive to snitch 
on everyone else, thereby making the community worse off. 
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Pertaining to Measure 37, this means that claimants will receive a premium above their 
true losses because all of their neighbors are not eligible or willing to submit claims.  
This premium takes the form of a higher land value due to exemption, or possibly a 
higher amount than deserved paid by the local government.  Conversely, as more and 
more people in a certain area become claimants and receive exemptions, the lower the 
increase in property values will be due to an increasingly supply of developable land.  
Therefore, it is greatly beneficial to be one of the first successful Measure 37 claimants.  
Future claimants should see lower gains and may possibly point to the gains that Measure 
37 brought their neighbors and deem their windfall incorrect or unfair; it will just be 
proof of the “scarcity effect” in action. 
Besides the overestimation in property value loss that the “scarcity effect” can 
lend itself to, an ardent desire to capture this effect can also lead to the diminished 
productivity and efficiency of lands just outside the UGB.  Many of the Measure 37 
claims call for development of rural lands to take advantage of the heightened market for 
developable land.  However, compared with urban densities, these proposed 
developments are low-density, likely to attract those who want more space.  This presents 
a problem: in the future, when the UGB increases to include these developed lands, their 
densities will be too low for true urban development.49  Building infrastructure and 
adding public services will be too costly.  Thus, the efficiency of adding these properties 
to the urban area will be reduced in terms of added tax revenue per dollar spent on 
infrastructure.  Productivity is also reduced because these lands will not be easily 
redeveloped to alleviate population growth. 
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From the previous discussion, we can devise an unanswerable rhetorical question:  
if local governments must compensate landowners when a regulation devalues their 
property value, should there be any obligation for landowners to compensate local 
governments when regulations produce positive gains through amenity and scarcity 
effects? 
When a developer lives in a reality with competition, he does not jump at buying 
the first piece of developable land that is offered for sale.  The developer must decide 
among various pieces of property which ones suit him the best.  Some properties may 
have positive attributes that make it more valuable such as a view, a stream or a forest.  
Other land may be worth more to the developer due to the location factor.  Obviously, the 
right to develop close to a city is worth more than the right to develop far away in an area 
without water and electrical infrastructure (there is more demand for properties with the 
former characteristic than the latter).  Therefore, in a free market, any given claimant’s 
land may be worth less to a developer than neighboring properties due to a lack of these 
valuable features.  Since the text of Measure 37 demands that the “fair market value” be 
determined under a system of no regulation, we are obligated to consider just this:  which 
properties would a developer pay more for if they could develop any property.  Again, we 
have no way of knowing exactly how much money a developer would have paid for a 
piece of land given a landscape of different regulations.  However, it is important to take 
this into consideration because Measure 37 fundamentally fails at considering the 
possibility that a given piece of land may not be more valuable than surrounding land in a 




PART 2: EMPIRICISM 
 The theoretical underpinnings introduced in the previous section will become 
integral to the empirical portion of this thesis.  The externalities associated with the 
“amenity effect” and the market effects inherent in the “scarcity effect” will become the 
basis upon which all empirical estimation will lay.  While many positive and negative 
amenities can be precisely estimated using economic techniques, the estimation of market 
effects will be largely theory based.  Such estimation will allow this author to construct 
an analysis around the overarching belief that zoning changes, especially initiated 
through Measure 37, do have an effect on the sales prices of neighboring properties. 
 Section VI contains a detailed discussion of many amenities and their 
hypothesized effect on property sales prices; these are the amenities that will be estimated 
because the author believes that they will have the most significant effects on sales 
prices.  The author’s hypotheses regarding the “scarcity effect” will conform to the 
theories introduced in Section V, the Economics of Measure 37.  Section VII discusses 
the data, while Section VIII contains the methodology behind obtaining the results.  




 Since the goal of this thesis is to determine what affects the sales price of 
residential properties, we must hypothesize what types of zoning may drive down 
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demand for nearby residences.  For instance, any amount of industrial zoning within a 
mile radius of residential properties should reduce demand due to noise, traffic and 
pollution externalities.   
 Commercial properties should exert different effects on the different types of 
residential properties.  For instance, only Neighborhood Commercial (CN) zones should 
have a positive effect on Single Family Residences (SFR) and Rural Residences (RRFU) 
because these properties and those who demand them lend themselves to low density, 
quite areas.  The other types of commercial areas should exert negative effects on low 
density properties because they are higher volume operations.  Most likely, however, 
while the effect should be highly negative within a quarter mile radius, perhaps the 
influence on properties in a “donut” area further than a quarter mile but less than a full 
mile will be positive because of a convenience factor.   
The more intense commercial districts should have a positive effect on Mixed-
Use Commercial and Residential (MUR) and Multi-Family Residences (MFR) because 
those who likely demand them wish to live in centralized areas with quick and easy 
access to a job and shopping area.  This theory is discussed further as it also pertains to 
the “Distance to Downtown” variable. 
 Most importantly, the various residential types should exert different effects upon 
each other.  SFR and RRFU properties should lose value as higher density residential 
properties move into the neighborhood (including the movement from SFR1 to SFR16).  
This situation is the most pertinent with regards to Measure 37 based upon many 
claimants’ calls to subdivide and develop their property.  These low density properties 
should lose value as a MUR or MFR property is developed nearby due to increased 
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density, noise and traffic.  Furthermore, there should be a decrease in value with any 
increase in density.  There will be an adverse affect on values if, for instance, many high 
density SFR16 properties sprang up around a low density SFR1 property.   
On the other hand, the effect of density on MUR and MFR properties should be 
harder to predict.  People could demand these properties because they are close to 
shopping, employment and cultural areas.  Therefore, higher density would be a plus.  
But, people could put higher demand on these properties when they are located near open 
space and a low density neighborhood where there is less noise and pollution.  Due to 
these potentially varying tastes, which could be a result of income, the effects of other 
residential properties on MUR and MFR lots will not be either largely positive or 
negative. 
 
Distance to Downtown Portland 
 The distance from a given property to a major urban area likely has a distinct 
effect on land value.  After all, one of the first rules of real estate is “location, location, 
location.”  For certain types of properties, notably high density residential complexes and 
commercial enterprises, the land value should be quite high near the city core.  
Elementary urban economics states that firms pay high land rents because demand is high 
for centralized land that is near the most consumers and is the most accessible by roads.  
Also, face-to-face contact is relied heavily upon by firms for the collection and 
distribution of information.  These functions are preformed most efficiently in centralized 
areas.50 
                                                 
50 O’Sullivan, Arthur.  Urban Economics.  McGraw-Hill: New York, 2003.  Pg. 173. 
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 As for the residential properties, high density complexes which house a high 
proportion of a city’s low-income citizens occupy the most expensive land.  This is due to 
the fact that for low-income citizens, commuting costs are prohibitive and there is a 
benefit being near the most jobs.  For obvious reasons, each low-income household 
occupies little land area.  However, as incomes rise, the demand for extra housing 
outweighs the commuting costs and people move to larger properties further from the 
city.  These high-income citizens incur higher commuting costs as a trade-off for lower 
land rents and housing costs.  These properties are likely zoned as low density single 
family residences.  The exceptions to these rules are seen in areas with high amounts of 
“cultural amenities” such as parks, shopping areas, museums and restaurants which often 
draw high-income individuals back to the central city.51 
 The general point is that the distance to central urban areas is a likely determinant 
of land value.  For commercially zoned properties, proximity to the city should 
correspond to higher land values.  The same goes for high density residential properties.  
On the other hand, it is likely that there is an ambiguous effect on land value as low 
density residential properties get closer to the central urban areas.  In one sense, the costs 
of transportation between work and commercial areas are lower.  However, there are 
greater noise and pollution externalities.  The overall effect here will depend on whether 
the demand for convenience outweighs the demand for a rural setting among those people 
leaving the central city to consume more land and housing.   
 
Distance to Commercial Districts 
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 There are distinct externalities associated with living near commercial districts, 
most notably Neighborhood Commercial (CN) and General Commercial (CG) districts.  
These areas, along with Office Commercial (CO) zones have the highest probability of 
being near residential properties.  Whether the estimated externality associated with 
commercial areas will be positive or negative remains to be seen.  The reported distances 
will likely have a significant effect on land value if only because they can help describe 
the unique locations of properties.  The demand for land can be affected by what is 
conveniently located near it.   
 I posit that living near a CN zone will have an opposite influence on land value 
than that of a CG zone.  The types of firms present within the CN zone are inherently 
smaller than firms zoned otherwise and better suited to fulfill the needs of relatively low 
density residential areas.  Small grocery stores and locally owned small businesses 
constitute firms zoned CN.  I hypothesize that a close proximity to one of these properties 
will have a positive effect on land value.  There should be a higher demand for properties 
near areas where essential provisions are located, especially if these areas act as 
community gathering places.  CN firms must be small and therefore cause less traffic and 
noise externalities than larger firms, factors which would decrease values.  Within the 
dataset, these firms are much less likely to occur in large groups.  Most landowners 
should be happy to accommodate a couple of CN firms nearby that are not too 
overbearing. 
 CG firms, on the other hand, will likely cause negative effects on land value due 
to their greater potential for noise and traffic externalities.  Individuals likely demand 
property removed from these “large format retailers” like Home Depot or Costco.  
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However, it would be wrong to assume that people do not want easy access to these types 
of retailers, especially ones that cater to the needs of the region.  There may be a positive 
effect on land values due to these zones at a reasonable distance.  I hypothesize that the 
net effect will be negative because the desire not to have a view of a strip mall or 
warehouse store will outweigh the desire for the casual convenience of shopping in such 
areas a few times a month.  Furthermore, CG firms are usually spatially clustered 
together suggesting that their combined traffic and noise externalities are quite large. 
 
Distance to Hospitals 
 Do hospitals exert an “amenity effect” upon housing sales prices?  It seems 
logical to assume that the location of hospitals is not a significant source of demand in the 
housing market.  Anyone who is living within any city boundary will be within a few 
miles of a hospital.  Being very close to a hospital, however, should result in a negative 
effect due to extra noise and traffic.  This amenity could play a role among those 
properties zoned rural residential (RRFU) as an exception.  These properties are located 
outside of the city boundary and are usually not connected to urban infrastructure and 
services.  A common concern, which the City of West Linn cited in response to a 
Measure 37 claim, is the fact that as more rural residential properties are developed, there 
will be an overwhelming strain on already limited emergency services.52  Therefore, it 
could be lucrative if a rural residential property were also located near a hospital.  
However, this effect would also be correlated with the demand for low density rural areas 
combined with the conveniences of many urban services including sewers and electrical 
utilities. 
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Distance to Schools 
 The strength and sign of this amenity could very well differ depending on the type 
properties that are being analyzed.  All properties within the urban growth boundary will, 
by necessity, be within a few miles of a school.  For urban properties, at this point, it is 
rather ambiguous whether schools will have a positive or negative effect on values.  In 
one sense, there may be a positive effect on properties near neighborhood primary 
schools with playgrounds and fields.  However, there are negative attributes of schools 
such as increased noise and traffic, especially near secondary schools with older students 
of driving age.   
 It must be noted that the dataset used in this thesis does distinguish the school 
from the playground or field attached to it.53  The open space owned by each school is 
designated as a Park zone and is considered a separate parks amenity.  Therefore, it is 
very possible that the distance to schools amenity will have zero or negative influence on 
land value because of the noise and traffic effects.  This is also why I have decided to not 
distinguish between the distance to a primary school or a secondary school. 
 There may be another story when considering only rural residential properties.  
Similar to hospitals, it is possible that a public service like education is quite rare outside 
of the city limits so those properties that have quick and convenient access to schools will 
be in high demand.  This would cause a positive effect on values.  Admittedly, this effect 
will be small because not all home buyers have children of school age so the location of 
schools does not cross every buyer’s mind. 
 
                                                 
53 See Section VII for a complete description of the database. 
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Distance to Freeways and Major Roads  
 There are many obvious reasons why there is a low demand for residences along 
major roadways including noise, pollution and not-so scenic views.  For those residential 
properties along these roads, there will be a significant amount of negative effect on land 
values.  However, it is rather evident from the dataset and personal observation that there 
are very few residences within easy view of any huge roadways in Oregon.  Since there 
are so few residences near these roads in the dataset, the negative effect may not be 
present in aggregate terms.  In fact, this variable will likely tell a different story.  It will 
probably estimate how much value is attached to a quick and easy access to major 
roadways.  For properties within the urban growth boundary, there may not be a huge 
effect because no matter where someone is located within this boundary, it is probable 
that their work commute is only a few miles and trips to shopping areas are even shorter.   
 On the other hand, ease of access to major roads may be a strong selling point for 
those moving into rural residential districts.  Many of these households likely hold high-
income workers who still need to commute into the city.  Therefore, being close to but 
not literally next to a major roadway will have a positive effect on land values outside the 
urban growth boundary.  Clackamas County has shown an understanding that this 
demand is real by requiring rural developers to help alleviate transportation issues caused 
by their developments.  The problem of inadequate roads has been cited by county 
officials in response to a number Measure 37 claims.  They recognize that if some claims 
are approved, roadways must be widened.54  With the potential for increased congestion 
in rural residential areas, those properties that have the easiest access to the large roads 
leading into city will benefit from an increased demand. 




Distance to Parks 
 I hypothesize that parks and open space will exert an unambiguously positive 
effect on land values.  Parks are a positive amenity because they can create a sense of the 
outdoors as well as provide recreation opportunities within the city.  Parks can provide 
good views as well as the illusion (or reality) of low-density housing for individual 
residences.  People would rather see a grassy field and some swings outside their window 
than the side of another house.   
 The same analysis applies to rural residential properties.  In many cases, however, 
these homes are not provided with publicly-owned open spaces but rather privately-
owned farmland.  This farmland gives the same positive amenity effect as parks within 
cities although there is the potential for development.  Therefore, possible loss of 
neighboring farmland due to Measure 37 has become a concern. 
 It must be noted that the effect of parks and open space on land value will not be 
as great for rural properties as urban ones.  An urban residence near a low or zero density 
area is quite rare.  Due to this uniqueness and the past constraints on development near 
the urban growth boundary in the Portland area, the demand for such properties should be 
high.  Therefore urban properties will carry a higher value premium. 
 
Distance to Rivers 
 This measure should show that rivers are a positive amenity due to the sense of 
wilderness they provide, not to mention the recreational opportunities.  This natural 
setting, which lends itself to high concentration of trees also supplies homeowners with 
good views.  The river amenity could be very lucrative if a given property were located 
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within the urban growth boundary as well as near a body of water.  The convenience of 
urban life combined with the feeling of a rural area is highly valuable to many 
homeowners.   
 I hypothesize that the distance to the nearest river will have a positive effect on 
land values for both rural and urban residences as that distance decreases.  However, the 
effect on urban properties will be greater.  Rural residences appreciate rivers for likely 
the same reasons that urban residences do.  The only difference is the fact that open 
spaces and rural attributes are rare in urban areas.  Therefore, a higher premium is 
required to gain outright ownership or a view of this amenity.   
 
UGB 
 According to Metro, a government land use agency, the UGB is a tool used “to 
protect farms and forests from urban sprawl and to promote the efficient use of land, 
public facilities and services inside the boundary.”  Other uses include an incentive to 
continue to re-develop the buildings and infrastructure within the urban core in order to 
keep “downtowns in business.”  The UGB also promotes certainty among businesses and 
local governments regarding present and future placement of infrastructure needed for 
development.55  Essentially, the UGB works to constrain the supply of certain land uses 
and to control where they are located.   
 The UGB is flexible; Metro must provide a twenty year supply of land within the 
UGB for residential, commercial and industrial uses, with the supply adjusted every five 
years for added population and development.   
                                                 
55 See:  http://www.metro-region.org/article.cfm?articleID=277 
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 Depending on the type of residential zoning in question, the UGB effect should 
produce different results.  For those properties zoned “single family residential” or 
“multi-family residential,” there should be a positive effect associated with being inside 
the UGB as opposed to being outside of it.  If not already developed, these properties 
have development potential and are fair game to homebuyers, whose demand puts 
upward pressure on values.  This pressure is present in great amounts for those properties 
either consisting of or neighboring positive amenities.  Properties within the boundary are 
also valued higher because they come with guaranteed access to adequate road, sewer and 
electrical infrastructure as well as a school district. 
 For buyers looking for a single family residence, surely demand is lower in those 
areas where a well needs to be dug and a connection to the electrical grid built.  There 
may be a lot of open space, but it will not come with positive urban amenities.  
Furthermore, it does not make sense to build a multi-family residence outside an urban 
area.  Not only will the demand for that much housing be likely lacking, but according to 
urban economics, these residences are built to let consumers cheaply and efficiently 
occupy some of the most expensive land in a given urban area. 
 On the other hand, being within the UGB will have a negative effect on properties 
zoned “agriculture or forestry” or “rural residential.”  The uses associated with these 
zones legally require a lot of area.  It is undesirable to locate farms near developed areas 
because of conflicting interests; this fact has been brought up in discussions concerning 
the impact of Measure 37.  Conflicts include high volumes of dust, noise and spraying 
that coincide with farm operations.56  Rural residential properties should see the same 
negative effect because the allowed development is so controlled that those people who 
                                                 
56 Martin, pg. 31. 
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demand these large lots likely demand them because they want to be far from the city.  
Also, they may demand them because they believe they will someday be apart of the 
UGB.  If these rural residential properties were included, their zoning would change and 
the value would increase.  Measure 37 claimants state this fact and this is not disputed 
here.  However, the fair and precise magnitude of this effect will be discovered in the 
analysis section of this thesis. 
 
Distance to UGB 
 I hypothesize that those properties lying outside of the UGB will be worth more 
as they move closer to the boundary, everything else being equal.  This will be true for 
properties of any zone classification.  The properties outside of the boundary are 
subjected to more regulation that make many types of development illegal and prevent 
public construction of infrastructure.  Since the UGB is subject to expansion, properties 
closest to the boundary have the most potential future for development.  Investors may be 
willing to purchase a piece of farmland because they believe that sometime in the future 
it will be ripe for development.  This demand will cause the value of this property to 
increase.   
 This increased value due to development potential is the main reason why 
Measure 37 claimants were so aggrieved with the old land-use system.  However, it must 
be noted that the demand for potentially developable properties also depends largely on 
the unique positive amenities found near the property and the costs associated with 
building road and utility infrastructure.   
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Finally, we must not forget that the increased values that I empirically estimate in 
this thesis exist because the UGB exists.  Higher value effects on properties nearest to the 
UGB occur because completely undeveloped lands within the UGB are scarce.  
Therefore, if the UGB did not exist, there would be no scarcity effect and those same 
properties would not be benefiting from a positive value effect.  Simply, the large 
amounts of compensation demanded by many claimants stem directly from the scarcity 
effects caused by the same land-use regulations that many say are hurting their property 
values.   
 
Distance to Railroads 
 Heavy rail should most certainly exert a negative influence on land values due to 
the many adverse externalities associated with rail activities.  The most apparent 
externalities are noise, ground movement and pollution.  These factors should cause the 
greatest negative effect on small residential properties.  People generally expect to live in 
quiet areas and on a small lot, there are few places to go to escape the noise and calling 
the police certainly will not help.  On the other hand, the effect on large pieces of 
farmland will likely not be so severe.  The owner has the choice to build as far as he 
possibly can from the tracks. 
 
Elevation  
 Elevation is an important variable to control for because it can greatly correlate 
with land value and sale price.  This relationship, I contend, is due to the fact that 
elevation implies, but does not necessarily prove, the extent that a given property has 
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good views.  A property with a higher elevation relative to another logically indicates that 
the potential to see further is greater with the former than the latter.   
 View is a positive amenity that is very difficult to estimate.  It would be 
preferable if the data contained information regarding what landmarks can be seen from 
each property.  Also, a land slope value would be helpful but RLIS Lite does not contain 
data adequate to measure this for every property.  Therefore, I had to use a proxy, 
elevation, to help determine where views exist.   
 It is easy to conclude that elevation has a positive effect on all land values.  It 
makes sense to believe that people uniformly place high demand on properties with 
views.  Like parks, a view can place a sense of the outdoors within an urban setting.  It 




 The data used in this project is derived solely from the Metro Data Resource 
Center.  Metro is an elected government entity that serves the Clackamas, Multnomah 
and Washington counties in Oregon.  This region covers the Portland, Oregon 
metropolitan area as well as twenty-five cities that lie in its suburban area.  This 
organization undertakes the service of planning and policy making with the intent to 
“preserve and enhance the quality of life and the environment for ourselves and future 
generations.”57  Metro is funded by taxes, grants and voter-approved bonds as well as 
revenues from user fees charged to individuals and businesses for certain services.  Its 
                                                 
57 Preamble to the Metro Charter, November 1992.  See http://www.metro-
region.org/pssp.cfm?ProgServID=62. 
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tangible services include defining the urban growth boundary, setting land-use 
regulations, managing garbage disposal and data collection.   
 The Metro Data Resource Center compiles data from other government entities 
and agencies in the region including county tax assessors, the Portland Planning Bureau 
and the U.S. Census Bureau among others.  It also creates and maintains its own data.  
Metro provides the service of collecting and updating this wide array of data which is 
pertinent to the Portland metropolitan area.  The commercial form of this data available 
for consumer purchase is called the Regional Land Information System (RLIS Lite).  
Metro updates the data quarterly (November, February, May and August) and charges 
consumers a yearly subscription price for this access.  This author purchased the data at a 
student rate which includes no updates.  The dataset used for the empirical purposes of 
this thesis is updated through November 2005. 
 Due to the varying agencies that are involved in Metro’s RLIS Lite project, there 
exists a rich assortment of data types that go beyond basic property characteristics.  
Foremost, this dataset includes detailed tax assessor data on every property in Clackamas, 
Multnomah and Washington counties.  However, analysts solely using tax assessor data 
would only have information on the sale price, owner, land and building size of these 
properties and that is all.  RLIS Lite, while embracing tax assessor data, includes data 
concerning the external environment that is not necessarily part of any given property yet 
unambiguously affects property values and appropriate uses.  These types of external data 
include roads, rivers, parks and open spaces, school locations, tree canopy coverage, 
zoning and urban growth boundaries among other attributes.58  The inclusion of roads and 
                                                 
58 For a complete listing of the data contained in RLIS Lite (not all were pertinent to the goals of this 
thesis), see http://geode.metro-region.org/metadata/index.cfm?startpage=main.cfm?db_type=rlislite. 
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rivers in a dataset, along with their relation to given properties, can give an analyst a 
clearer picture regarding why a piece of land is valued at a certain price and why it is 
used in a certain way.  This type of spatial data is known as Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) data.59 
 The RLIS Lite data are very suitable for carrying out the goals of this thesis.  
Unfortunately, time and computational constraints made it necessary to choose only some 
of Oregon’s counties to work with.  Furthermore, most Oregon counties do not maintain 
adequate GIS data needed for an extensive analysis such as this.  Fortunately, the three 
Portland Metropolitan counties are vast and encompass a wide range of land types and 
uses.  The shear number of properties located within these three counties is vast as well—
there are 556,102 observations in the dataset. 
Multnomah County contains Oregon’s largest city and urban area.  Almost all of 
Portland’s residences, commercial and industrial districts lie within the county’s 464 
square miles.  Clackamas County, on the other hand, is roughly one-eighth urban.  Most 
of its 1,879 square miles is rural farm and forest land.  In fact, it encompasses Oregon’s 
largest mountain and a national forest.  Washington County is roughly 727 square miles 
and contains the western edge of the City of Portland.  The county proudly boasts to host 
Oregon’s largest companies including Nike and Intel while using “focused residential and 
industrial growth which has enabled the county to preserve 75% of its agriculture and 
forestlands.”60 
While it would optimal to include every county and property in Oregon, it would 
not be feasible due to the shear amount of computing required as well as the widely 
                                                 
59 See Appendix 1 for a complete illustrated description of GIS data. 
60 See http://www.co.washington.or.us/deptmts/cao/geninfo/geninfo.htm 
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varying price effects present between regions.  For instance, certain amenities such as 
distance to rivers may result in much different price effects on desert properties than 
urban properties.  Nonetheless, the author believes that these three counties provide an 
adequate sample to measure the effect that Measure 37 claims will have on the value of 
most Oregon properties.  These counties make up roughly 42% of Oregon’s population 
and 34% of all Measure 37 claims.  It is important to note that 85% of all claims originate 
in the Willamette Valley which includes Clackamas, Multnomah and Washington 
counties.  The Willamette Valley is almost entirely made up of farm, forest and urban 
land very similar to that found in the tri-county sample.  Only 15% of all claims originate 
in countries with arid, desert-like land unlike any land found in the RLIS Lite dataset.61 
Based on these statistics, the author contends that the data sample used in the 
following analyses adequately incorporate property and environmental attributes inherent 
in the “average” Measure 37 claim.  The results of this analysis will therefore be pertinent 
to present and future claims. 
Most importantly, this author contends that the individual variables used in the 
empirical section of this thesis are quite adequate for describing price effects on land 
value and sales price.  Again, this confidence is built upon the completeness of the 
dataset, especially its inclusion of external environmental factors that make the study of 
externalities possible.  TABLE 1 displays all of the variables used to analyze the effects 
on land value and sales price.   
 




                                                 
61 These statistics were formulated by the Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development.  
See http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/index.shtml. 
62 See Appendix 2 for a complete listing of the summary statistics for every variable. 
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VARIABLE NAME DEFINITION 
Area Square footage of tax lot as calculated by 
the GIS 
TLID Tax lot account number, also known as 
state_id.  This uniquely identifies every 
property. 
Rno Unique account or parcel number used by 
county assessor in Multnomah County. 
Ownersort First five letters of owner’s name 
Owner Owner’s name 
Oweneraddr Owner’s address 
Ownercity Owner’s city 
Ownerzip Owner’s zip code 
Sitestrno Site street number 
Siteaddr Site address 
Sitecity Site city 
Landval Real Market Value of land 
Bldgval Real Market Value of building 
Totalval Total Real Market Value (Landval + 
Bldgval) 
Bldgsqft Square footage of residential living area 
A_T_Acres Acreage of tax lot as shown in the County 
Assessor’s database 
Yearbuilt Year structure was built 
Taxcode County tax code 
Saledate Date of the most recent sale of the property 
with range 1885-2005 
Saleprice Price of the most recent sale of the property 
County County abbreviation 
X-coordinate Spatial coordinate from the X-axis that, 
along with the Y-coordinate, places each 
object (such as a school) in its own location 
on a plane.  Units are in feet. 
Y-coordinate Spatial coordinate from the Y-axis that, 
along with the X-coordinate, maps objects 
to unique locations.  Units are in feet. 
Zone_Class 43 Regional classifications into which 
zoning is generalized.  All properties in the 




The number of properties of each of the 43 
types of zones which fall within a one mile 
radius of each property.  (i.e. If the value 
were 2 for a given property under 
Zone21Count, there are 2 properties zoned 






The total area, in square feet, of each of the 
43 zones which fall within a one mile 




The total area, in square feet, of each of the 
43 zones which fall within a quarter mile 
radius of each property. 
(*)DistanceDowntown The distance to the Portland, Oregon city 
hall 
(*)DistanceCN The distance to the nearest property zoned 
“Neighborhood Commercial.” 
(*)DistanceCG The distance to the nearest property zoned 
“General Commercial.” 
(*)DistanceHospital The distance to the nearest hospital. 
(*)DistanceSchools The distance to the nearest school, not 
distinguishing the education level. 
(*)DistanceFreeway-Art The distance to the nearest road labeled 
“freeway” or “major arterial.” 
(*)DistanceParks The distance to the nearest park or open 
space. 
(*)DistanceRivers The distance to the nearest river. 
(*)UGB A 1 if the property is in the Urban Growth 
Boundary, a 0 if not. 
(*)DistanceUGB If the property is outside the UGB, the 
distance to the UGB. 
(*)DistanceRailroads The distance to heavy rail lines. 





Dummy variables for each year a property 
has sold (1970-2005).  Meant to be a 
regional price deflator which puts all sale 




All of these variables were derived from the RLIS Lite dataset.  Some variables 
were already present in the dataset while others are the result of manipulation by GIS 
software on preexisting data.  The variables marked with an asterisk (*) were derived by 
the author using such manipulation.63  These variables help describe not only the property 
                                                 
63 See Appendix 5 for a complete description of this methodology. 
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itself—how big it is, what it is used for and what is structures are built on it—but what 
makes it unique.  They are largely environmental and infrastructural attributes which I 
hypothesize will have a distinct positive or negative effect on any given property if 
located in the immediate area.  The magnitude of these effects remains to be seen.   
Undoubtedly, the most important variable in this dataset is “Zone_Class.”  
Measure 37 is an initiative that hinges on the controversy surrounding zoning laws and 
their application.  The definition of “Zone_Class” states that there are 43 unique zoning 
classifications used in the dataset of which one corresponds to every property.  Zoning 
describes what a given piece of property can be used for and to what extent; it does not 
necessarily tell us what it is currently being used for.  For example, zoning tells us that a 
certain property can accommodate residential houses of a maximum of 3,000 square feet.  
This allows the local government to control where homes, businesses and industrial areas 
lie so as to minimize harmful interactions or competing interests.  Zoning also helps 
control development and density, dictating where great numbers of people are allowed to 
move and live.  The planning of local government is usually provoked by natural 
resource, current infrastructure (sewer and electric utilities), public safety or aesthetic 
concerns.   
 All 43 zones present in the dataset are listed in TABLE 2.  These are local zones 
whose definitions are maintained by Multnomah, Clackamas and Washington Counties.  I 
numbered each zone so they were easier to manipulate using GIS software without 
potentially confusing the symbols and acronyms (the “Zone Class”) that originally 
identified them.  Notice that as the number associated with the “Zone Class” label 
increases, the various types of residential zones allow for higher housing density. 
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1 CC Central Commercial - allows a full range of commercial typically associated with CBD's 
and downtowns. More restrictive than general commercial in the case of large lot and 
highway-oriented uses. Encourages higher FAR uses including multi-story development. 
2 CG General Commercial - larger scale commercial districts, often with a more regional 
orientation for providing goods and services. Businesses offering a wider variety of goods 
and services (including large format retailers) are permitted in this district and include mid-
rise office buildings and highway and strip commercial zones. 
3 CN Neighborhood Commercial - small-scale commercial districts permitting retail and service 
activities such as grocery stores and neighborhood service establishments that support 
the local residential community. Floor space and/or lot sizes are usually limited to 
between 5,000 to 10,000 square feet. 
4 CO Office Commercial - districts accommodating a range of low-rise offices; supports various 
community business establishments, professional and medical offices; typically as a 
buffer between residential areas and more intensive commercial districts. 
5 FF Agriculture or Forestry - activities suited to commercial scale agricultural production or 
forestry, typically with lot sizes of 10, 20 or 30 acres or more. 
6 IH Heavy Industrial - districts permit light industrial and intensive industrial activity such as 
bottling, chemical processing, heavy manufacturing and similar uses with noxious 
externalities. 
7 IL Light Industrial - districts permit warehousing and distribution facilities, light 
manufacturing, processing, fabrication or assembly. May allow limited commercial 
activities such as retail and service functions that support the businesses and workers in 
the district. 
8 MFR1 Multi-family - single family, townhouses, row houses permitted outright. Max density 
permitted is 15 units / net acre. 
9 MFR2 Multi-family - single family, townhouses, row houses permitted outright. Max density 
permitted is 20 units / net acre. 
10 MFR3 Multi-family - single family, townhouses, row houses permitted outright. Max density 
permitted is 25 units / net acre. 
11 MFR4 Multi-family - single family, townhouses, row houses permitted outright. Max density 
permitted is 30 units / net acre. 
12 MFR5 Multi-family - single family, townhouses, row houses permitted outright. Max density 
permitted is 35 units / net acre. 
13 MFR6 Multi-family - single family, townhouses, row houses permitted outright. Max density 
permitted is 40 units / net acre. 
14 MFR7 Multi-family - single family, townhouses, row houses permitted outright. Max density 
permitted is 60 units / net acre. 
15 MUE Multiple Use Employment - an employment district that accommodates a broad range of 
users including offices, retail stores, warehouse distribution, and light industrial including 
manufacturing, fabrication, and assembly. 
16 MUR1 Mixed Use Commercial & Residential with FAR maximum of about 0.35
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17 MUR10 Mixed Use Commercial & Residential with FAR maximum of about 12.5 
18 MUR2 Mixed Use Commercial & Residential with FAR maximum of about 0.5 
19 MUR3 Mixed Use Commercial & Residential with FAR maximum of about 0.75 
20 MUR4 Mixed Use Commercial & Residential with FAR maximum of about 1.25 
21 MUR5 Mixed Use Commercial & Residential with FAR maximum of about 1.5 
22 MUR6 Mixed Use Commercial & Residential with FAR maximum of about 1.75 
                                                 
64 All zone classifications originate from the Multnomah, Clackamas and Washington County governments.  
They were copied from the RLIS Lite website.  See http://geode.metro-region.org/metadata/index.cfm? 
startpage=main.cfm?db_type=rlislite. 
65 “FAR” is an acronym for floor area ratio.  It is the ratio of square feet of commercial and residential 
space compared with total square footage of the property.  Therefore, a FAR of 4 indicates a multi-storied 
building. 
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23 MUR7 Mixed Use Commercial & Residential with FAR maximum of about 2 
24 MUR8 Mixed Use Commercial & Residential with FAR maximum of about 3 
25 MUR9 Mixed Use Commercial & Residential with FAR maximum of about 4 
26 PF Public Facilities - allows government building, institutional and cultural uses such as 
museums. 
27 POS Parks and Open Space 
28 RRFU Rural Residential or Future Urban - residential uses permitted on rural lands (1 dwelling 
unit per lot) or areas designated for future urban development, typically lots are 10 or 
more acres 
29 SFR1 Single family - detached housing with minimum lot size from 35,000 sq. ft. 
30 SFR10 Single family - detached or attached housing with lot sizes around 3,500 sq. ft. 
31 SFR11 Single family - detached or attached housing with lot sizes around 3,000 sq. ft. 
32 SFR12 Single family - detached or attached housing with lot sizes around 2,900 sq. ft. 
33 SFR14 Single family - detached or attached housing with lot sizes around 2,500 sq. ft. 
34 SFR15 Single family - detached or attached housing with lot sizes around 2,300 sq. ft. 
35 SFR16 Single family - detached or attached housing with lot sizes around 2,000 sq. ft. 
36 SFR2 Single family - detached housing with minimum lot size from 15,000 sq. ft. to a net acre 
37 SFR3 Single family - detached housing with lot sizes from about 10,000 sq. ft. to 15,000 sq. ft. 
38 SFR4 Single family - detached housing with lot sizes around 9,000 sq. ft. 
39 SFR5 Single family - detached housing with lot sizes around 7,000 sq. ft. 
40 SFR6 Single family - detached housing with lot sizes around 6,000 sq. ft. 
41 SFR7 Single family - detached housing with lot sizes around 5,000 sq. ft. 
42 SFR8 Single family - detached housing with lot sizes around 4,500 sq. ft. 
43 SFR9 Single family - detached housing with lot sizes around 4,000 sq. ft. 
 
 
 Please note that SFR13 is skipped in TABLE 2 because no properties in the data 
set were given this classification. 
The Analysis section will demonstrate how important the zoning data is towards 
advancing the goals of this thesis.  The zone is the most fundamental indicator of the 
greatest legal use of each property.  Since every Measure 37 claim has been filed on 
behalf of a residential or agricultural property, the analysis preformed later will only take 
these various properties into consideration.  In other words, only the effects of varying 
factors upon the sales prices of these properties will be considered.  It will be assumed, of 
course, that any of these residential properties or farms could become a commercial or 
industrial property in the future due to Measure 37 claims. 
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The basic summary statistics are reported in TABLE 3.  These statistics show how 
the descriptive variables vary among properties depending on type of residential or 
agricultural zone.  For the purposes of this cursory analysis, the residential zones have 
been generalized into four main groups: SFR, MFR, MUR and RRFU.  Agriculture lands 
are denoted by the group, FF.  The reader will be able to discern the most conspicuous 
differences in size, value etc. between the four types of residences.  Some large values are 
rounded because they were reported in scientific notation by the statistical software.  This 
first set of statistics is not screened for outliers and erroneous observations. 
 
TABLE 3: Summary Statistics, No Filters 
 
AREA 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
SFR 362776 12095.19 49557.48 .005 6415158 
MFR 49848 12669.12 135436.2 11.297 26500000 
MUR 47358 13530.11 73872.44 0 7043847 
RRFU 33810 116040.9 344839.2 8.56 49300000 
FF 39345 1711981 22600000 49.906 1020000000 
BUILDING SQUARE FEET 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
SFR 362776 1763.62 2432.64 0 479448 
MFR 49848 2090.92 8932.73 0 748503 
MUR 47358 3799.05 20123.9 0 907500 
RRFU 33810 1508.98 1653.4 0 104812 
FF 39345 1196.06 1928.31 0 200937 
BUILDING VALUE 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
SFR 362776 152248.2 432227.3 0 129000000 
MFR 49848 206385.3 1142867 0 151000000 
MUR 47358 454258.7 4263573 0 439000000 
RRFU 33810 136333.4 368944.6 0 46000000 
FF 39345 105076.8 289078.4 0 31500000 
LAND VALUE 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
SFR 362776 102146.2 108001.1 0 17000000 
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MFR 49848 86492.2 235258.6 0 21300000 
MUR 47358 179784.8 693544.6 0 36400000 
RRFU 33810 122154.3 117452.7 0 7064530 
FF 39345 144785.1 274991.9 0 11900000 
TOTAL VALUE 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
SFR 362776 254395.9 482609.7 0 134000000 
MFR 49848 292878 1306018 0 158000000 
MUR 47358 634046.9 4691316 0 467000000 
RRFU 33810 258528.2 417856.7 0 48800000 
FF 39345 253481.9 428916 0 31900000 
SALES PRICE 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
SFR 362776 145428.4 401146 0 69000000 
MFR 49848 197522 882321.6 0 51300000 
MUR 47358 596340.2 18700000 0 2000000000 
RRFU 33810 113221 240393.8 0 17100000 
FF 39345 119654.5 445110.5 0 19100000 
 
The statistics above were derived without using any filters to mete out outliers 
and observations containing incomplete or omitted data.  They are displayed so that the 
reader can compare them with the filtered statistics and ascertain why filters are 
reasonable and necessary before any analytical inferences can be made.  For the most 
part, filters will eliminate observations which could bias results such as incorrect or 
perplexing sales prices of $0. 
The summary statistics for the various types of residential properties with filters 
are given in Table 466.  This is the data used in the analysis section of this thesis. 
 
TABLE 4: Summary Statistics, Filters 
 
AREA 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
SFR 149330 10307.67 24799.75 509.49 3084514 
                                                 
66 See Appendix 3 for further discussion of the filters. 
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MFR 13209 9621.68 27549.1 663 1741655 
MUR 8142 10120.9 48424.1 576.02 3196605 
RRFU 6461 131932.9 139392.2 2426.7 3896564 
FF 4526 227315.9 455804.9 4230.3 6299097 
BUILDING SQUARE FEET 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
SFR 149330 1875.37 915.17 0 93907 
MFR 13209 2173.82 7049.61 0 289168 
MUR 8142 2313.54 5709.3 0 183344 
RRFU 6461 2005.8 1515.83 0 12622 
FF 4526 1882.2 1492.8 0 32570 
BUILDING VALUE 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
SFR 149330 146883.4 134770.9 0 21100000 
MFR 13209 150350.3 406830.7 0 22300000 
MUR 8142 167655.7 461979 0 20500000 
RRFU 6461 184309 606618.7 0 46000000 
FF 4526 156628.5 156286.6 0 1925850 
LAND VALUE 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
SFR 149330 102632 59163.45 10000 5079200 
MFR 13209 91637.3 98536.9 10000 4433000 
MUR 8142 115298.1 234275.7 12200 13200000 
RRFU 6461 154529.4 140586.6 10000 7064530 
FF 4526 151592.4 114727.8 10000 3573980 
TOTAL VALUE 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
SFR 149330 249515.5 169244.5 10000 25700000 
MFR 13209 241987.6 487936.5 10000 26700000 
MUR 8142 282953.7 604888.7 12200 21800000 
RRFU 6461 338848.6 663497.5 10000 48800000 
FF 4526 308719.5 221162.2 10000 4102310 
SALES PRICE 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
SFR 149330 193547.1 109165.4 2415 5050000 
MFR 13209 187838.5 203152.3 8000 8058470 
MUR 8142 208194.3 205778.1 10000 7300000 
RRFU 6461 237716.3 178505 2200 2590057 
FF 4526 316587.6 325272.1 10000 5021730 
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While some observations have been compromised, it is easy to see that many 
outliers are now excluded by glancing at the statistics.  Notice that the standard 
deviations have fallen considerably.  The statistics now make sense intuitively.  The 
mean area is largest for rural residential and agriculture properties, whose lack of density, 
expansive land uses and location on cheap land relative to the city center demand more 
space.  Building square feet is greatest for urban residential properties, especially highly 
dense multi-family residences and mixed use commercial and residential.  It is obvious 
that each individual apartment is not counted, but the combined square footage that is 
developed on a given tax lot.  This is fortunate; tenants do not own their apartments and 
therefore cannot issue claims.  The analysis will only include properties that have legal 
owners.  It is no matter that some values for building square feet and value are zero.  
Ownership of land is the only major necessity to filing a claim.  Building value is highest 
for dense urban residences because they are larger compared to single family residences 
and rural structures. 
The land value is much higher on average for rural rather than urban properties.  
This is simply because on average, each rural property has more square footage.  
Economic theory dictates that land is more valuable in urban areas due to a higher 
demand.  The analysis portion of this thesis will control for this and other factors in order 
to determine the sole value of land.  Statistics for the total value follow much the same 
argument.   
Before the filters were put in place, the rural properties did not have the largest 
sales prices on average.  Now, they do which corresponds to a higher land values and 
total values among these properties.  Notice that the standard deviations are much lower, 
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the means now relate much more closely with the assessed total value means and 
formerly very high maximum values have fallen. 
Now that the erroneous and unhelpful observations have been filtered, we can 
turn to the methodology and hypotheses behind the forthcoming analysis. 
 
VIII. METHODOLOGY 
This author will use regression analysis to determine how various property and 
housing characteristics (the explanatory variables) determine the land value (the 
dependent variable) of a given property.67  Since sales prices are the revealed market 
values, they will be used as a proxy for changes in land value.  The explanatory variables 
will include a multitude of housing and environmental attributes as well as zoning from 
the RLIS Lite dataset.  The variables in my dataset should give me accurate estimates of 
the effect of various attributes, such as property square footage, will have on land value.   
When economists use a certain explanatory variable, it is said that they are 
“controlling” for that variable.  Suppose that there exist two properties that are the same 
in every way except for the fact that one is larger by one square foot.  In this case, it 
would be easy to determine the value of one more square foot; it would be the difference 
in the land value of the two properties.  However, reality never gives us properties that 
are the same.  First of all, every property occupies a different location which alone is a 
big determinant of land value.  Regressions allow the analyst to control for location and 
size (explanatory variables) and determine statistically by how much an additional square 
foot of land would add to the land value on two identical pieces of property.  Of course, 
many other attributes can be controlled for. 
                                                 
67 See Appendix 4 for a detailed discussion regarding the theoretical foundation of regression analysis. 
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Obviously, determining what affects land value will be quite complex due to the 
numerous factors that can affect its value.  Nonetheless, I am making the bold assumption 
that the variables in the RLIS Lite dataset are the most important in determining land 
value.  Due to the fact that the variables are spatially mapped, I can control for the one 
main thing that makes every property unique: location.  This can be accomplished by 
determining each property’s distance to roads and rivers as well as elevation, among 
other things.  These are attributes that no two properties will have in common.  Therefore, 
the regressions in the analysis portion of this thesis should be as complete and relevant as 
possible for measuring the affects on land value. 
By corollary, any other property characteristics not included will have either 
insignificant effects or effects that cannot be easily measured from any data.  For 
example, changing consumer preferences for different characteristics cannot be measured 
because this is a psychological phenomenon.  Another example is air quality.  
Unfortunately, this is a realistic shortcoming in the dataset.  It is very likely that people’s 
demand for elevation and distance to urban areas, for example, have changed many times 
in the past three decades.  This can cause a problem known as omitted variable bias.  This 
type of biasness has a number of consequences, the most important being misleading 
conclusions about the effect of certain variables on land value.  The incorrectly estimated 
variables will be those that are correlated with the omitted variable.  If air quality were 
left out, it is possible that the effect of elevation on land value could be overestimated 
because this estimate would include not only consumers’ demand for a better view but 
also a property further away from the city with a higher air quality.  Therefore, it would 
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appear that the dollar effect of elevation is higher than it actually is because it is 
describing more than it should be due to omitted variables in the dataset. 
Again, this author believes that the variables used in the empirical analyses of this 
thesis are quite adequate for describing price effects on land value.  I created the variables 
listed in TABLE 1 that are marked with an asterisk (*) in order to avoid the problem of 
omitted variable bias.  They help to tell the most important story regarding every 
property, which, in essence is its location.  Furthermore, they represent the amenities that 
were described in the Hypothesis section.  These amenity variables reveal consumers’ 
demand for neighborhood and environmental amenities that otherwise cannot be 
determined from basic tax assessor data.  Therefore, all the variables used in the 
regression analysis will be properly estimated with little overestimation due to biasness. 
All of those variables marked with an asterisk (*) are spatial in nature.  They were 
all created using a GIS software package called ArcMap.  Notably, ArcMap allowed this 
author to find the distance from every property in the database to the amenities listed in 
the Hypothesis section.  Using this data, this author was able to estimate the price effects 
of these various amenities.  See Appendix 5 for a complete discussion behind the 
processes and tools used to create these variables. 
 It is important to note that all of the price effects described in the Analysis section 
refer to changes in property sales prices.  In order to convert the sales data in the database 
to current dollars, this author created variables to control for yearly effects on sales 
prices.  These year dummy variables are meant to work as regional price deflators for the 
years 1970 to 2005.  The sales prices in RLIS Lite are not recorded in 2005 dollars but 
rather reflect the dollar amount paid when the property was last sold.  For purposes of 
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this study, the most recent sale date for the observations range from 1970 to 2005 because 
prior to these dates almost all of the observations contain incomplete sales date or price 
data.   
 In order to convert all sales prices into today’s dollars to adjust for inflation and 
changing demand, I could have multiplied them all by the Consumer Price Index which 
other researchers have used when studying housing prices over time.68  However, this is a 
national index which takes every region’s housing fluctuations into consideration.  
Housing supply and demand is not the same all over the country; it is tough to compare 
housing in New York City, Houston and Portland.  Therefore, I created my own regional 





 This section will apply empirical statistical analysis to the rhetorical and 
hypothetical discussions produced earlier in this thesis.  Much of the analysis will focus 
on estimating the “amenity effects” mentioned by Jaeger and the Oregon Supreme Court 
as well as many Oregonians wary of the potential Measure 37 claims in their 
neighborhood.  The goal of this section is to show that the sale price—and therefore the 
revealed market demand—of a given property is influenced by many factors including 
those that are environmental and those that are societal based.  In every regression, sale 
price is the dependent variable.  All of the hypotheses presented in the methodology 
                                                 
68 Netusil,Noelwah.  “The Effect of Environmental Zoning and Amenities on Property Values: Portland, 
OR.  Forthcoming in Land Economics.  Pg 13. 
69 See Appendix 6 for a graph of the housing price trends for urban and rural land in the Portland 
Metropolitan area. 
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section remain the same because the effect on sales price should be mostly attributable to 
changes in land value.  Sales price is a much better measure, however, because it 
represents changes in market demand, not an assessed (estimated) market value.   
 The belief that a Measure 37 claim can and does affect sales prices of neighboring 
properties is the overarching hypothesis entering this section.  Some of this influence is 
caused by the elimination of “positive” amenities such as rivers, open space and low 
density housing due to new development in areas where it had previously been illegal.  
The rest of the effect is caused by the addition of “negative” amenities that produce 
byproducts such as traffic, noise and pollution.  By now, it should be clear which 
variables are predicted to be positive and which are supposed to be negative.  
 In every regression, the variables that control for a property’s general size 
attributes are displayed first and then the characteristics that help describe location are 
subsequently given.  It is unlikely, for the most part, that Measure 37 claims will affect 
these attributes because the acts of claimants can neither create nor destroy these; the 
exception being the distance to a major road arterial.  It is possible that a large roadway 
may need to be built in order to serve a new development.  In this case, a given property 
may become nearer to an arterial and its externalities.   
 Lastly, the zoning variables are displayed.  Again, they represent the effect that a 
percentage change in a given type of zoning has on sales prices.  These are the variables 
most likely affected by Measure 37 claims since claimants are effectively asking for a 
zoning change that would legally allow more development or density.   
 Please note that the year dummy variables have been suppressed for reasons of 
brevity.  They are present in every regression, however, because they put all monetary 
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amounts into current dollars.70  Appendix 8 contains the unabridged version of every 
regression.  Furthermore, note that the value of each coefficient is listed with its standard 
error.  The asterisks mark the level of statistical significance that each variable takes.  In 
practically every instance that two asterisks (**) occur, the p-value is effectively zero, 
meaning that these variables are most certainly not equal to zero and have an effect on the 
dependent variable.  Variables with one asterisk (*) are still considered significant while 
those that have none may not, for reasons of probability, have an effect on the dependent 
variable. 
 Regression Set 1 is a linear estimation of different property amenities and 
attributes for both urban and rural properties.  This linear specification means that for 
each unit change in the variables, the coefficient shows the direct monetary effect on 
sales price.  The urban and rural properties were separated by regressing land-uses that 
respectively belong to either category.  Land-uses, not zones, were used as the regressed 
properties because Measure 37 claims originate from a small portion of land-uses, 
namely residential, with the sole purpose to request that the zone be changed (or 
compensation paid).  We want to know what the land is currently being used for in order 
to determine whether it is a likely Measure 37 candidate and if it is truly urban or rural.  
The “Urban” regression includes properties being used for single and multiple family 
residences whereas the “Rural” regression includes those being used for rural residential 
and commercial farm and forestry purposes.  While not technically residences, there have 
been many claims issued for farm and forest properties. 
 For simplicity, the regressions will be shown and discussed in a fractional form. 
                                                 
70 The Year Dummies are consistent with the hypothesis; they monotonically decrease going into the past to 




REGRESSION SET 1 
 
 (1) (2) 
COEFFICIENT URBAN RURAL 
   
area 1.349** 1.036** 
 [0.012] [0.015] 
   
areaSQ -0.000000217** -0.000000151** 
 [6.15e-09] [3.29e-09] 
   
bldgsqft 43.55** 5.077 
 [0.15] [3.34] 
   
bldgsqftSQ -0.000158** 0.00352** 
 [0.00000091] [0.00055] 
 
 These variables control for the size of the property and the structures that lay on 
it.  The squared terms are meant to control for the diminishing marginal returns from 
adding extra square footage of land or structure to a property.  While such additions may 
add a lot of value at first, eventually it adds less and less because at some point too much 
space becomes very cumbersome or expensive to maintain.   
 The addition of area is similar for both land types; an acre of urban use land adds 
roughly $59,000 to the sales price while in rural areas it is $45,000, everything else being 
equal (ceteris paribus).  This makes sense because land nearer to the city center is usually 
worth more.  Notice that there is a major difference in the addition of building square 
footage.  In the rural areas, more building space usually means less space to farm, which 
is what the land is likely best suited for. 
The following variables control for the effects that the location of the property 
places upon the sales price; they measure the effect of the distance from certain 
amenities.  Note that the distances to CN and CG zones as well as the distances to parks 
and railroads have been omitted due to collinearly with other variables.  Unfortunately, 
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the RLIS Lite railroad data does not extend past the UGB, meaning that it was highly 
correlated with the distance to the UGB.  This is a problem that results in coefficient 
misspecification.  The effect exerted by parks can be seen in the POS variables while the 
effects of the commercial zones on sale price are present in variables CC through CO. 
In every instance, those non-squared coefficients that have negative signs are 
actually “positive” amenities.  As you move further away from these amenities, the sales 
price decreases.  Conversely, those variables with positive signs are “negative” amenities. 
The squared terms for each of these variables is added because in some cases, the 
effect of the amenity changes from positive to negative or vice versa at a certain distance.  
For instance, it may not be good to be located near a freeway, but being far away may be 
bad due to isolation from a high speed road network.  This implies that there is an 
“optimal distance” from most amenities, especially if it is initially better to locate away 
from the amenity. 
 For every amenity, there is a graph which plots the dollar effect on the Y-axis, 
beginning at zero, as distance increases on the X-axis.  At the point where the line crosses 
the X-axis is where the squared term has completely outweighed the linear term.  Of 
course, the graph on the left represents the urban properties while the rural is on the right. 
 
distdowntown -1.101** -5.344** 
 [0.040] [0.87] 
   
disDTSQ 0.00000570** 0.0000189** 





















 In both cases, we see that being near a major downtown area is a “positive” 
amenity.  It is likely, that the draw of shopping areas combined with employment creates 
a demand near the city.  It is sort of curious that sales prices are higher for rural 
properties near the city.  However, the effect of suburbanites desiring close access to 
employment probably outweighs those farmers wishing nothing to do with the city.  For 
further proof of this, look at the freeway distance graph below.   
 Also, in both cases, there is a point (between 38 and 56 miles out) where being 
further from the city center is beneficial.  At this point, the highest and best use for land is 
probably agriculture where the conflicting interests between urban and rural uses are non-
existent.  Furthermore, the people who live that far away probably want nothing to do 
with a large city. 
 
distfreeart 1.990** -3.861** 
 [0.20] [1.18] 
   
disfreeartSQ -0.000339** 0.000109* 

















































 Here, we notice that the distance to major roadways is a negative amenity for 
urban properties and a positive one for rural uses.  In urban areas, there are many roads so 
it is easier to travel from place to place.  Also, shopping and employment areas are more 
condensed.  Therefore, being close to a major road is not in high demand; there is too 
much noise and pollution and it does not add much convenience.  However, at about 1.13 
miles the squared term takes over and it is no longer good to be further from a road due to 
isolation.  In fact, the optimal estimated distance from a major roadway is about .60 miles 
where the amenity effect produces the largest positive influence on sale price. 
 On the other hand, it is best to be close to major roadways in rural areas.  Again, 
this is probably because many people like moving to low density areas but desire a quick 
and convenient commute to urban areas.  Otherwise, the benefits of living in a rural area 
may be lost.  At about 6.6 miles, the squared term outweighs the linear and it becomes 
best to live further from major roads.  At this point farmers, for instance, probably have 
little desire for quick road access and the externalities it creates. 
 
disthospital 0.659** -0.278 
 [0.074] [0.68] 
   
dishospitalSQ 0.00000825** -0.00000716 



















































 It appears that the distance to the nearest hospital produces different amenity 
effects for urban and rural properties.  For urban properties, it is negative; it is best to live 
further away from hospitals.  Like other negative amenities, this is probably a case of too 
much traffic and additionally, a reminder of illness.  It is curious, however, why the 
squared term does not work in the opposite direction.  Reasonably, one would expect that 
at a certain point, it would not be beneficial to live far from a hospital because response 
times would be slow and access limited.  This fact works against my hypothesis where I 
stated that close access to limited emergency services on the city’s fringe would be 
beneficial. 
 Conforming to my hypothesis is the positive effect hospitals have on rural 
properties.  Again, I stated that there would be a demand for rural land near limited 
services, especially where road access may be poor.  Unfortunately, these two variables 
are not statistically significant which indicates that there may be no effect at all.  At the 
very least, it does not appear as if there are negative effects. 
 
distrivers 0.0284 -3.123* 
 [0.091] [1.29] 
   
disriversSQ 0.0000184** 0.000107* 

















































 In the case of rural properties, the effect of river distances on sales price is 
positive and then eventually turns negative.  It appears that it is best to either live right on 
the river or far away from it.  In this case, there is a least optimal river distance (2.8 
miles) for rural properties.  It could be true that at this point, one does not receive river 
views yet has to deal with recreational traffic or noise from public areas.  On the other 
hand, the river distance coefficient for urban properties in not significant meaning it 
probably does not affect sales price. 
 Therefore, I was correct in my hypothesis that there would be a positive effect.  
However, I was wrong about what types of properties would demand river access more.  
It appears that it is rural lands that derive the greatest benefits from rivers.  Perhaps in 
urban areas, river pollution drives down some of the demand despite its relative rarity 
compared to rural areas. 
 
distschools 5.719** 7.589** 
 [0.22] [1.33] 
   
disschoolsSQ -0.000445** -0.000251** 
































Distance (ft) from Given Property 
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 The effect of schools on sales prices is predictably negative to a point.  Living 
close to a school is not good because of the extra noise and traffic.  For urban properties, 
it is optimal to live about 1.2 miles from a school while it is roughly 3 miles for rural 
ones.  I was wrong in assuming that rural areas would benefit more from schools; perhaps 
there is a higher premium placed on properties that are far away from any urban-type 
services that produce noise since this is what many people are trying to escape when they 
move away from the city.   
 
distUGBdistance -2.507** -1.161* 
 [0.16] [0.55] 
   
disUGBSQ -0.00000137 0.0000175* 
 [0.0000026] [0.0000097] 
 
 











































































Distance (ft) from Given Property 
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 For those properties that are of an urban nature, it is best to be located near the 
UGB if outside of it.  These properties are closest to urban infrastructure and services yet 
enjoy the aspects of a rural area.  Furthermore, land close to the UGB should be 
demanded by developers who may speculate that it will soon fall within the UGB and the 
realm of legal development.  There is little chance that properties far away from the 
UGB, except via Measure 37 claims, will soon be developable.   
 While the same effect is initially true for rural lands, there is a positive squared 
effect that causes sales prices to begin increasing again at a certain distance.  This 
suggests that there is a demand for urban services and potential development among rural 
properties.  However, this demand dries up at a distance from the UGB because 
developers realize that there is little chance that this land will be given the same legal 
standing as urban land.  At this point, the demand for a true rural setting away from 
potential urban-rural conflicts dominates.   
 
elevation 107.1** 44.01** 
 [1.35] [7.95] 
   
UGB 16610** -48698** 
 [2214] [9396] 
 
 Here we see that elevation, which is a proxy for view, has a pretty high impact on 
the sales price.  In the Portland urban area, elevated land around the city is rare and 
obviously commands a premium.71  A 100 foot elevation increase adds $10,710 to the 
sales price, ceteris paribus.  In rural areas, the premium is $4,400 per 100 feet.  The effect 
is smaller here possibly because there is no city view. 
                                                 
71 Note that elevation is not counted from the highest level in a multi-storied building; it is always a 
measure of feet above sea level from the ground. 
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 The UGB variable measures the relative effect of being inside the UGB against 
the not being inside of it.  Therefore, urban-type properties get a $16,600 premium from 
being within the boundary relative to being outside of it.  This is due to the ability to 
develop these properties as well as partake in urban services not already controlled for 
such as utilities.  In many cases it may not even be the sudden ability to develop but the 
sudden market demand for development.  When a property is passes into the UGB, 
whether it was previously developable or not, demand increases because of its promised 
access to urban services.  It is unclear how much of the UGB effect is attributable to the 
constriction of supply of developable land and how much is due to the access to urban 
amenities, however.  Nonetheless, this is the effect that Measure 37 claimants hope to 
capture when they attempt to re-zone their property to a higher density and give it a 
designation that is usually reserved for the UGB. 
Claimants of single family and multi family residences are correct to assume that 
their property value would be higher within the UGB.  There is little doubt of that fact.  
While there may be a benefit for the individual landowner, however, there is a potentially 
larger cost on society of adding properties into the boundary due to the increased 
infrastructure and other costs of urban services. 
 Hypothetically, the UGB premium should decrease as more area is added into the 
boundary because the supply of developable land will increase.  This is the “scarcity 
effect” discussed earlier.  Unfortunately, this effect cannot be measured here because it 
would require the estimation of the intersection of many individual property supply and 
demand curves.  It is economic theory on which we must rely for this belief.   
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 The effect of the UGB on rural properties is much different.  It is estimated that 
there is a $48,700 deduction when they move into the UGB.  This is likely the effect of 
rural-urban conflicts that many farmers are worried Measure 37 will create.  The highest 
and best uses of much of the farm and forest land outside of the UGB are probably 
agricultural ones.  Before land use regulations were passed, the free market had already 
determined this.  Therefore, by moving rural properties into the UGB, it may be hurting 
land value to place land that is better suited for agricultural uses under development or 
else land-use conflicts may result which will hurt farming efficiency and productivity.   
 Again, this measure does not take the “scarcity effect” into consideration.  The 
effect of bringing rural land into the UGB will take away value due to reasons just 
discussed.  However, if the zoning is changed from a rural designation to a higher density 
urban designation, the “scarcity effect” will likely overtake the $48,700 deduction and 
there will be a positive net effect.  In fact, keeping everything else constant, if a rural 
property where moved into the UGB and its zone designation were changed to SFR or 
MFR, the net effect would be a sales price increase of about $65,000.  This is a premium 
that many Measure 37 claimants wish to claim. 
 The fact that the distance to and inclusion in the UGB has a significant effect on 
sales prices demonstrates that land use policies can and do affect property values.  This is 
also an indirect indication that Senate Bill 100 did manipulate property values among 
Portland metropolitan properties when it was passed in 1973.  Had the land and housing 
market been free for the past few decades, there is no doubt that these premiums would 
not exist.  Many claimants would contend that policies such as this only decrease 
property values.  However, the regression results above indicate that this belief may not 
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be true.  On average, all properties have lower values the furthest they are from the UGB.  
Claimants would likely point to the properties closer to the boundary and state that 
because they are worth more, their property must have decreased in value.  This 
statement would be wrong; without a land use policy, the UGB premium would not exist 
and the landowner whose land is far from the now non-existent boundary would notice 
that his property is just as valuable as anyone else’s.  The huge supply of developable 
land would drive the price down.  In this case, the “scarcity effect” is at work.  
Unfortunately, with the current data, we can only logically notice this effect; it cannot be 
empirically estimated here. 
 The next set of variables control solely for the differences in sales price among 
the various types of land uses.  In each of the regressions in the analysis section, land use 
is used to discern the types of properties regressed because I wish to find the effect on 
established properties that are being used for their highest legal use.  In other words, I 
wish to eliminate those cases where the regressed properties are vacant although the zone 
allows a differing use.  Therefore, the variables with “LU” indicate land use.   
In the urban regression, the given value for the LUMFR dummy is relative to the 
LUSFR dummy and in the rural regression, the dummies are relative to rural residential 
properties.  LUMFR properties are worth more than other urban land uses because these 
properties are allowed higher density development and they are also more likely located 
on centrally located land.  LUAGR properties are worth more than LURUR properties; 
farmland should be worth more because the soil is rich and productive.  Rural residential 
land is not worth much, as urban economics has taught us, because it is not centrally 
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located.  LUFOR properties are worth less likely because there is no legal development 
potential and the soil and slope are not suitable for farming. 
 
 
LUMFRdummy 29455**  
 [2527]  
   
LUAGRdummy  16427** 
  [5928] 
   
LUFORdummy  -32087** 
  [6373] 
 
The following variables represent the effect of a percentage change in various 
types of zoning within a quarter mile radius of a given property.  These are the variables 
that have the “QUART” suffix.  The variables that contain “DN” are “donuts” that 
measure the effect of a percentage zoning change between a quarter mile and a full mile 
radius from a given property.  Please refer to TABLE 2 in the Data section for complete 
definitions of the zones mentioned below.  Note that the effects of some types of zoning 
with multiple ranks such as MFR have been merged together to prevent co-linearity and 
correlation among similar zones.   
 
PercentSFRnot123Quart -487.1** 1760** 
 [21.6] [404] 
   
PercentDNSFRnot123 -213.3** -1741* 
 [35.2] [844] 
   
PercentMFRQuart -528.1** -474.7 
 [25.8] [511] 
   
PercentDNMFR -1570** -3802* 
 [43.6] [1723] 
   
PercentMURQuart -628.8** 2982** 
 [25.7] [1054] 
   
PercentDNMUR -336.4** 12990** 
 [40.9] [2954] 
   
PercentINDUSTQuart -740.5** -1476 
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 [34.2] [1027] 
   
PercentDNINDUST -20.55 1262 
 [42.1] [1220] 
   
PercentCCQuart -538.4** 204374 
 [84.8] [198906] 
   
PercentDNCC -616.4** 20013* 
 [142] [12055] 
   
PercentCGQuart -750.5** 1185 
 [44.9] [1466] 
   
PercentDNCG 721.3** 5157* 
 [73.4] [2618] 
   
PercentCNQuart -943.5** 35864** 
 [120] [12395] 
   
PercentDNCN 553.8** 6353 
 [166] [25700] 
   
PercentCOQuart -110.3 -48472* 
 [128] [23889] 
   
PercentDNCO 2694** -14398 
 [260] [9718] 
   
PercentFFQuart -1006** -228.1 
 [31.4] [295] 
   
PercentDNFF 95.64* -1088 
 [39.2] [752] 
   
PercentMUEQuart -586.7** 858.7 
 [39.8] [2995] 
   
PercentDNMUE 174.2** -6057** 
 [51.9] [1950] 
   
PercentPFQuart -982.1** -2599 
 [46.7] [1743] 
   
PercentDNPF -914.2** 1353 
 [78.6] [2133] 
   
PercentPOSQuart -428.7** 2824** 
 [36.1] [827] 
   
PercentDNPOS -543.5** -4936** 
 [49.4] [1308] 
   
PercentRRFUQuart -1498** -860.9** 
 [28.5] [281] 
   
PercentDNRRFU 285.4** -879.5 
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 [40.4] [758] 
   
Constant 223897** 688129** 
 [3859] [73137] 
   
Observations 168123 6611 
R-squared 0.67 0.65 
 
 These results conform quite well to stated hypotheses.  It is important to note that 
for both regressions, these values represent the effect on sales price relative to one 
percentage of SFR1, SFR2 and SFR3 which are the lowest density of residential 
properties.  This makes for a nice estimate; these variables are effectively describing the 
hypothetical situation in which a percentage of area within a quarter mile radius of a 
given property (about 54,700 square feet or 1.25 acres) is suddenly converted from low 
density residential zoning to each of the zoning types listed in the regressions.  
Furthermore, the donut variables describe the situation in which a percentage of the area 
between a quarter and a full mile radius has a zoning change.  This represents 
approximately 820,000 square feet or 19 acres. 
 We must be careful when interpreting these results.  Due to the difference in size 
between the quarter mile radius and the donut areas, similar coefficients do not have the 
same magnitude of effect on sales price.  For example, assume that the coefficient for 
both the quarter mile and donut variable is $500 and the change in zoning is 40 acres.  
The effect on every property within the quarter mile would be $16,000 while it would 
only be $1,050 for every property in the donut.  This difference will become clear in the 
case study below. 
 Economic theory would tell us that for the most part, a switch in zoning from SFR 
1, 2 and 3 to most other types of zoning would constitute a decrease in value for 
neighboring properties.  Denser allowable uses of land permit the possibility of more 
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development or commercial areas in one’s own backyard or neighborhood.  In other 
words, they have the potential to create many negative externalities which will cause 
neighboring sales prices to fall.  In fact, this is the precise effect that these regressions are 
displaying. 
 Some greatest negative effects on urban properties are increased percentages of 
multi-family residential as well as mixed use commercial and residential districts.  This is 
true for both the quarter mile and donut distances.  These types of zones allow quite a lot 
of density in the form of many housing units per square acre and multiple storied 
buildings.  It is not hard to imagine the types of externalities that are inherent with living 
near these types of properties.  They could include loss of positive environmental 
amenities or increased noise and traffic.  There could also be negative effects due to an 
aversion to lower socio-economic classes.  Notice, for instance, that higher density single 
family residences have a lesser impact on sale prices. 
 Relative to SFR 1, 2, and 3 properties, higher density single family residences 
command a negative effect.  Notice that the effect on properties within a quarter mile of 
the zoning change is much higher than the effect on lands further away.  This is quite 
expected; the negative externalities associated with higher density zoning should have a 
larger tangible impact on those properties closest to zone change.  The effect of multi-
family residential properties on urban land is also quite largely negative due to the high 
density externalities.  While it might seem that the effect is larger for properties in the 
donut area than the quarter mile area, this is not the case.  A ten acre increase in MFR 
zoning in the quarter mile area decreases every sales price by $4,200 while the same 
increase only deducts $826 in the donut area.  This estimate confirms perfectly to the 
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stated hypothesis; not only does high density zoning cause decreases in value, but the 
effects are much larger for the closest properties. 
 Industrial districts (here light and heavy industries are combined) have distinctly 
negative effects on urban properties.  The negative effect is very large in the quarter mile 
area; no one wants a noisy and possibly polluting industry to suddenly appear next door.  
On the other hand, the effect on donut properties is quite miniscule although negative 
nonetheless.  This relative indifference to living within a near but not too near an 
industrial area could be due in part to the new belief that it is trendy to live near industrial 
warehouse districts.  Consider the Pearl District in Northeast Portland. 
 The effect of commercial districts on urban properties is very interesting.  Any 
type of commercial district within a quarter mile of urban land commands a negative 
effect on sales price.  This is very reasonable; no one wants a commercial district nearby 
due to excess amounts of traffic and noise.  Relatively speaking, the commercial district 
that provides the lowest negative externalities compared to low density residential zoning 
is the Office Commercial zone.  This is intuitive; the CO zone is described as a buffer 
between residential and heavy commercial districts that contains many community 
business establishments.  These types of properties could provide many convenient, low 
impact services with lower externalities.  Other commercial zones have greater negative 
effects within the quarter mile area; surprisingly, the General Commercial zone has a 
smaller negative effect than the Neighborhood Commercial zone which is contradictory 
to my hypothesis.   
 The results become exciting when the effect of commercial districts within the 
donut area is considered.  For every commercial zone, the effect becomes systematically 
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positive when the zoning change occurs further away than a quarter mile.  The largest 
positive effect is a $2,694 premium attached to Office Commercial properties.  Again, 
this makes sense; it could be quite valuable to have community business establishments 
nearby for the convenience.   
 Due to the coefficients on the commercial properties, we can see that there exists 
an optimal distance that one should live from such districts.  This distance lies 
somewhere beyond a quarter mile, where noise and traffic are likely not going to reach.  
Empirically speaking, suppose that a ten acre shopping area zoned General Commercial 
(CG) made up of “large format retailers” (such as Costco or Office Depot) moved near a 
neighborhood.  Those residential properties with an quarter mile would lose $6,000 each 
while those properties in the donut area would gain $380 each.  Again, this makes perfect 
intuitive sense. 
 See Table 5 for a complete estimation of the effects that the various zones have on 
urban land.  Every value listed in the table is the direct cost or benefit that every property 
within the given area receives. 
TABLE 5: Monetary Influence of Selected Zones on Urban Properties 
Effect ($) of Ten Acre Increase of Zoning on Urban Land 
Zone Quarter Mile Quarter to Full Mile Donut 
High Density Residential -3,825* -112* 
Multi-Family Residential -4,225* -826* 
Central Commercial -4,307* -324* 
General Commercial -6,004* 380* 
Neighborhood Commercial -7,548* 291* 
Office Commercial -882 1,418* 




 Rural residential and agriculture properties (RRFU and FF, respectively) have 
negative effects relative to low density residential when they are located within a quarter 
mile.  This could be because they are a signal that the given property may be out of the 
UGB and urban services are far away.  Consider that commercial properties take less off 
of the sales price.  It seems convincing that proximity to urban services is a significant 
positive amenity.  This logic is further verified when we consider that there are positive 
effects on properties when rural land is in the donut area.  People obviously value open, 
low density spaces.  However, if these spaces are in the donut area, it is a sign that a 
given property is getting the best of both worlds: urban services and seldom developed 
open space. 
 Finally, we see that public spaces and land have negative effects.  Public Facilities 
(PF) exert an effect that is quite large, and understandably so; it includes properties such 
as prisons.  Properties designated Parks and Open Space (POS) are also negative.  For 
both PF and POS zones, the effect is resoundingly negative both in the quarter mile and 
donut areas.  While I hypothesized that parks would be a positive influence, it appears 
that I was wrong.  The effect of the traffic as well as the likely homeless appears to not 
prove beneficial.  In a city such as Portland, with many parks, one will never live very far 
from one anyway. 
 The effect of zoning on rural properties is a little different.  While all of the urban 
coefficients are statistically significant, many of the rural coefficients are not.  There 
could be two reasons for this phenomenon: first, rural landowners on average could be 
less picky regarding the types of land uses surrounding them.  This is entirely reasonable 
to believe since rural properties are much larger and the externalities associated with 
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zoning changes may be less pronounced.  However, based on the uproar that some claims 
have caused among farming communities, this explanation cannot be the only one.  
Second, it could be due to a lack of rural observations containing zoning data on high 
density properties.  Due to Senate Bill 100, high density and commercial zones are hard 
to find outside of urban growth boundaries.  Also, since these properties are so large, 
neighboring properties may not have been counted in the zoning data because their 
geographic center is greater than a mile away.  Therefore, many of the true effects of 
zoning changes on rural properties may not be seen until more Measure 37 claims are 
validated. 
 Relative to low density SFR properties, higher density SFR properties within a 
quarter mile produce positive effects but the influence turns negative when we move into 
the donut area.  This arrangement seems confusing:  why would a 10 acre increase in 
high density SFR land produce a $14,000 premium if located nearby and subsequently 
decrease values by $916 if further away?  This effect is possibly driven by the effect the 
UGB has on sales prices.  Rural lands with a lot of high density zones nearby are more 
likely located near the UGB, a positive amenity for surrounding properties.  Rural 
residential properties, which are bound to have the lowest rural-urban conflicts and are 
the best candidates for future high density development, are probably driving these 
results. 
MFR zoned properties produce an understandable effect.  For both distances, the 
effect is negative although it is not significant for the quarter mile distance.  However, the 
MUR properties are estimated to have a curious positive influence.  The fact that a 
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commercial and residential complex near a rural area would produce a positive effect 
does not seem to follow intuition.   
The effect that commercial zones place on rural properties varies among the types 
of zone.  Central Commercial (CC) zones add a very large premium to rural properties.  
Again, this is probably due to having the best of both worlds: low density housing near 
employment and business districts.  For every ten acres increase in CC zoning in the 
donut area, there is a premium of $10,500.  An increase in the quarter mile area would 
command a premium of hundreds of thousands of dollars, but it is not statistically 
significant.  These properties are likely owned by only the richest Portland suburbanites.  
Similarly, the Neighborhood Commercial (CN) zones add a huge positive premium on 
rural property.  A ten acre increase of this zoning in the quarter mile area adds $287,000.  
The magnitude of this effect is doubtful, however, and is probably driven by outliers 
although it indicates the positive effect of having a commercial district that is normally 
rare in rural areas nearby.   
Conversely, the effect of Office Commercial (CO) properties is quite negative and 
significant for the quarter mile area.  A ten acre increase in CO zoning relative to low 
density SFR zoning results in a $388,000 deduction for every property.  This result is 
curious; it is probably driven by outliers and a small number of observations.   
See Table 6 for a complete estimation of the effects that the various zones have on 
urban land.  Every value listed in the table is the direct cost or benefit that every property 




TABLE 6: Monetary Influence of Selected Zones on Rural Properties 
Effect ($) of Ten Acre Increase of Zoning on Rural Land 
Zone Quarter Mile Quarter to Full Mile Donut 
High Density Residential 14,081* -916* 
Multi-Family Residential -3,797 -2,001* 
Central Commercial 1,634,984 10,533* 
General Commercial 9,472 2,714* 
Neighborhood Commercial 286,904* 3,343 
Office Commercial -387,768* -7,577 
Agriculture -1,824 -572 
*-Statistically Significant 
 When I hypothesized that high density zones would have a significant effect on 
rural property values, I wrongly assumed that the data would contain a lot of instances 
where there are high density properties near rural areas.  However, with only 8,026 
observations in this regression and the simple fact that this type of arrangement is not 
likely to happen often due to previous limits on rural development, these results are 
probably driven by a few remaining outliers.  Perhaps having these properties within a 
one mile radius, which could be a signal for nearby urban services, is rare in rural areas 
and does provide a positive effect.  Since a mile radius accounts for a lot of area, these 
benefits could be coming by way of little externality.  It is very likely that if the size of 
the radius were reduced, the positive effects would diminish and even turn negative as the 
true effect on bordering properties is estimated. 
 Parks and Open Space (POS) zoning produces an opposite effects depending on 
the distance.  Having parks nearby produces a positive influence on sales prices.  Unlike 
urban land, parks are recreational areas are much sparser in rural areas.  On the other 
hand, this type of zoning becomes a negative amenity when placed further than a quarter 
mile away.  In fact, a ten acre increase at this distance results in a $2,600 decrease in 
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sales price.  It is possible that at this distance, properties receive negative externalities 
such as excess traffic yet are too far away to enjoy the scenery. 
 Another curious result lies in the negative or statistically insignificant estimation 
of increased forest and rural residential (FF and RRFU) zoned lands near rural areas.  It 
might seem intuitive that it would be best if rural properties were near each other.  Again, 
this effect is relative to low density residential zoning.  Similar to the increased amount of 
high density SFR and MUR zones within the mile radius, fewer rural zones could be a 
proxy to indicate a given property is near the UGB.  At this location, the sale price should 
jump relative to similar properties because of the potential for development.  Remember 
that the effect of moving inside the UGB is very negative only when the rural zoning 
remains attached to the property.  While urban services would be available, development 
remain illegal.  Only when a given rural property is given an urban zone designation and 
moved within the UGB does its value significantly increase.  This logic points to the fact 
there are lucrative benefits from being near the UGB and this is likely the effect that is 
being measured in the rural regression. 
 When empiricists believe that there are significant outliers remaining in the data 
or that it is not normally distributed, they sometimes produce regressions using a log-
linear specification.  Due to the nature of the rural results, Regression Set 2 was produced 
with this specification.  The same regressions shown above, except with the dependent 
variable taken to the natural log, are given in Appendix 9.  Unfortunately, after running 
tests for skew-ness due to outliers in the data, this specification did not seem to eliminate 
the problem. 
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 The log-linear specification reports the coefficients as partial elasticities.  This 
means that we are shown the percentage growth effect that a unit change in the 
explanatory variables has on the dependent variable.  Therefore, if you multiply the 
coefficients by 100 you find the percentage change in sales price.72 
 These regressions do not vary significantly from the earlier linear model.  For the 
most part, the signs stay the same, especially in the urban regression.  The magnitude of 
the effects also appears reasonably similar. 
 
X. CASE STUDY 
 The regression results discussed above can be utilized in many useful ways.  It 
has been shown that the “amenity effect” exists and in some instances is quite largely 
positive or negative depending on the amenity in question.  This analysis should have 
particular consequences for anyone interested in those factors that affect housing prices in 
aggregate.  However, the following case study should give readers, especially 
Oregonians, an illustrative view of the estimated effects a single Measure 37 claim will 
have on the surrounding community. 
 The property used for this case study is located just outside of Portland’s UGB in 
Clackamas County.  It is currently zoned for farm use (FF) so it is not developable and 
has no guaranteed connection to urban infrastructure such as roads.  The owner wishes to 
divide this property, which is 53 total acres, into many one or two acre low density 
residential lots.  Since this subdivision is illegal under current zoning laws and the owner 
acquired the land in 1977 before many land use regulations were implemented, the owner 
                                                 
72 The dummy variables are interpreted in a slightly different way; you must take the antilog (to base e) of 
the coefficient, subtract 1 from it and then multiply it by 100 to find the partial-elasticity.  The result does 
not vary greatly from the displayed coefficient. 
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has decided to submit a claim for $11.6 million with the State of Oregon.  The only basis 
for this monetary request lies in the fact that a developer recently offered the owner 
roughly the same amount of money to purchase the property.73 
 FIGURE 1 displays the property in question.  The dot at the center of the smallest 
blue circle represents the center-most point of the property.  The boundary of the smallest 
blue circle is a quarter mile from this point, while the boundary of the larger circle is a 
full mile from the point.  The red line is the UGB which noticeably separates the rural 
land from the urban.  Noting the number of points representing properties on the right-
side of the line, it is obvious that this area is quite dense and thereby urban. 
 FIGURE 1: Case Study 
 
 Using the same results from the regressions above, we can estimate the total effect 
a zoning change will have on those properties within the two circles.  TABLE 7 displays 
                                                 
73 Martin.  Pg. 9. 
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the aggregate effect that this claim, as well as other possible land uses, will have on the 
neighboring community. 
TABLE 7: Aggregate Effect ($) Selected Zoning Changes will Exert on Community 
Zoning Change Total Effect on 
Quarter Mile 
Area 






1,109,014 -440,012 669,002 
High Density 
Residential 
358,619 -1,538,871 -1,180,252 
Multi-Family 
Residential 
-823,594 -8,266,862 -9,090,456 
General 
Commercial 
-827,351 4,729,640 3,902,289 
 
 The table indicates that the proposed claim, which changes the zoning from farm 
to low density Single Family Residential, actually has a positive effect on the community.  
This is not entirely unexpected; the neighboring properties will not be subjected to a large 
increase in noise and traffic.  Furthermore, much of the positive effect is attributable to 
increases in rural sales prices because it now appears as if they are closer to the UGB. 
 If the claimant were to request the ability to change the zoning to higher density 
residential, which is entirely possible because of the long span of ownership, the total 
spillover on the community would be negative.  This is expected because of the increased 
noise and traffic that these developments would bring.  While this claimant is not 
threatening to develop high density lots, the threat of other claimants doing it is real and 
the effect would be a multi-million dollar loss for the community. 
 Finally, it appears that a commercial site in this area would provide a beneficial 
effect.  This is due to the convenience that many people would gain due to such a 
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development being further than a quarter mile away.  For those properties next to such a 
zone change, the sale price will decrease by $31,800. 
 Many readers may wonder why the claim should not be immediately allowed 
because the largest negative effects estimated here do not match the estimated damages 
that regulations had on the property in the first place.  However, note the “scarcity effect” 
argument whereby it was mentioned that developers would not have asked this claimant 
for his property for such a high price if no regulations had been in effect for the past 
thirty years.  Due to current regulation, the claimant’s land is scarce which is artificially 
driving up its price. 
 Furthermore, note that there are un-estimated “amenity effects” that also accrue 
because there is a zoning change.  The estimates in TABLE 7 do not take into 
consideration the monetary effect that adding more people to the school district, 
increasing emergency services, building a larger road and extending sewage and 
electrical lines will have on the community.  All of these factors would result in a further 
deduction from sales prices which would make any claim validation even worse for the 
community than estimated. 
 
XI. EMPIRICAL CONCLUSION 
 The results of the previous section strongly suggest that there is a distinct 
“amenity effect” associated with housing in the Portland Metropolitan area.  As 
hypothesized, such amenities as roads, schools and zoning have large influences upon 
sales prices.  Furthermore, there is a dichotomy in many cases between those amenities 
that are valuable to urban land and those that are valuable to rural land. 
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 Oregonians must understand that some measurable amenities such as the urban 
growth boundary and the distance to certain types of zoning have positive effects on sales 
prices.  Other types of amenities such as the distance to freeways and certain high density 
zoning have negative effects on sales prices.  Many of the positive amenities are 
promoted by land use regulations while many of the negative ones are abated by 
regulation; land use regulations do not have an unambiguous negative effect on sales 
prices. 
 The previous analysis strongly indicates that changing the land use structure in 
Oregon causes many unintended or hidden externalities.  A successful claim that simply 
changes the development potential of a piece of land can cause a loss of tens of thousands 
of dollars to neighboring properties.  This does not even consider the further loss 
associated with the actual development of the land and the roads near it.   
 The empirical and theoretical conclusions of this thesis point to the fact that 
suddenly allowing some Oregonians to strip away the past thirty years of regulations will 
have unintended monetary effects on their neighbors and cause market effects upon 
themselves.  In many cases, these monetary effects are negative while the market effects 
are positive.  If the market effects could be reliably estimated here, we would likely find 
that the community loses more than the individual gains from Measure 37 in many cases. 
 Therefore, those who advocate Measure 37 are advocating for a redistribution of 
property values without public input.  This same argument was used to criticize Senate 
Bill 100.  Senate Bill 100, however, was a complete land use framework that provided 
subsidies and community-wide regulations that mitigated much of the negative effects 
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that some legally un-developable lands faced.  Measure 37 is neither a framework, nor 
does it fairly relieve landowners from decades of perceived losses from regulation. 
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PART 3: THE FUTURE OF MEASURE 37 
XII. CONTINUING CONFUSION 
 Proponents have interpreted the passage of Measure 37 as a call to end virtually 
all land-use planning in Oregon.  However, opponents have cited recent polls which state 
that 60 to 70 percent of Oregonians want to keep community and land protections or 
make them even stronger.74  How can such contradictory beliefs of Oregonians be 
reconciled?  Perhaps this indicates that Oregonians are ready for a change in planning 
systems, yet Measure 37 is not quite the change they anticipated.  This could explain the 
constant legal and neighborly battles surrounding Measure 37 claims today. 
 Currently, there are hundreds of Measure 37 claims in almost every county in 
Oregon.  Demands for compensation range from a couple of thousand dollars to 60 
million dollars.  Claims range from the lost benefit from cutting down some trees to the 
lost revenue a golf resort could potentially make if it were built.  Recently, Measure 37 
was deemed unconstitutional in the Marion County Circuit Court.  Among other reasons, 
the judge ruled that the measure creates a “special class of citizens.”  Namely, those 
families owned pieces of land both before and after most land-use regulations were 
enacted in 1973 are effectively entitled to compensation or completely unregulated use of 
their land while newer landowners are not.  Also at stake was the issue of whether a land-
use regulation could ever be enacted in Oregon ever again given the fact that everyone it 
                                                 
74 Stacey, Bob.  “Transferable Development credits should be used as Compensation under Measure 37.”  
The Oregonian, February, 20 2005. 
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affects will be eligible for a claim.  In other words, Measure 37 requires the government 
to pay to govern.   
 As of February 21, 2006 the Oregon Supreme Court overturned the trial court’s 
ruling and deemed Measure 37 constitutional.  After months of suspension due to the 
lower court’s ruling, the claim process was allowed to continue once again.  The Oregon 
Supreme Court ruled, in part, that precedent has been set in earlier cases where certain 
citizens cannot bring themselves within certain legally favored closed classes such as 
Vietnam veterans.  More importantly, it was ruled that “In Oregon, the Legislative 
Assembly and the people, acting through initiative or referendum processes, share in 
exercising legislative power.”75  This highlights the fact that Oregon voters, through a 
simple majority, can vote a law into the state constitution which must be obeyed as long 
as it does not violate any other piece of the constitution.   
 The legality of whether Measure 37 can remain on the books has been cleared up 
yet the debate over its functionality and fairness rages on.  The justices wrote, “Whether 
Measure 37 as a policy choice is wise or foolish, farsighted or blind, is beyond this 
court’s purview,”76 obviously alluding their understanding of the controversy that 
surrounds the initiative.  Further debate will likely center upon the arguments laid out in 
this thesis.  An added point of contention surrounds the ability of claimants to pass along 
development rights when they sell their land, thereby allowing someone else to benefit 
from the earnings potential of the land.  The landowner is compensated through a higher 
selling price of his land.  However, when a land-use regulation is waived by way of a 
Measure 37 claim, it is waived for the current landowner only because it is he who 
                                                 
75 Oregon Judicial Department Appellate Court Opinions.  (CC No. 05C10444; SC S52875).  Found at:  
http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/S52875.htm.  Filed February 21, 2006. 
76 Ibid. 
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claimed that his right to use the land has been compromised, not the developer.  
Currently, it is claimant who must also pose as the developer. 
 Measure 37 is a policy issue that will be relevant to every Oregonian who has a 
stake in the state’s future.  Some people will welcome the freedom to use their property 
as they see fit.  Others will be dismayed by the outcropping of new development.  Oregon 
will no longer be nationally-renowned for its meticulous city planning.  Some citizen’s 
land will gain value while others will lose out.  Nevertheless, it is likely that Oregon 
voters will see a modification to or elimination of parts of Measure 37 on the November 
2006 ballot.  Even voters in other states, such as Washington, have been promised to see 
similar initiatives in the future by property rights lobbyists.  The only point that cannot be 
debated is the fact that the effects of Measure 37 will be felt long into the future. 
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PART 4: APPENDICES 
 
XIII. APPENDIX 1 
 
 RLIS Lite data take the form of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data.  
Unlike spreadsheet data that take on purely numerical properties, GIS data contain spatial 
properties which allow it to be viewed as if on a map.  By utilizing common desktop 
mapping software, the user can see how the various data elements fit together by layering 
them on top of each other.  For instance, the user can take the data for roads and layer it 
on top of the data for rivers thereby producing their own map which displays Portland’s 
roads in relation to its rivers.  Therefore, instead of having one database listing roads and 
one database listing rivers without a noticeable relationship between the two, the user can 
visually see where the roads and rivers intersect.  Each of the attributes listed above 
contain this sort of spatial information.  Figures 2 and 3 display examples of various 
RLIS Lite data mapped onto the same portion of Portland using software called ArcMap.  
This program is very versatile; it allows users to add or subtract data from the map in 
order to see only what they are interested in, while also selecting the order in which these 
data files are mapped (or layered) upon each other.  ArcMap facilitates the creation of 
user-defined and manipulated virtual maps. 
 
FIGURE 2: Property Layer
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  FIGURE 3: Zoning Layer
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77 Figure 2 displays parts of east and west Portland, which are separated by the Willamette River in blue.  
Every green polygon represents a property.  The white areas are roads while the dark points are schools.  
This is an example of the visual and spatial properties of the RLIS Lite dataset. 
78 Figure 3 displays the same area of Portland as Figure 2.  This time, zoning is the focus of this map.  
Properties are represented by the grey polygons.  The light blue area represents single family residences, 





 Having data in a spatial form is very powerful for analytical purposes.  Mapping 
software contains many mathematical algorithms which allow the user to find the 
distance between points or calculate areas, for example.  Users can also use the software 
to merge various data, which lie on top of one another, together into a single dataset.  
Property data can be merged with zoning data as well as elevation data to produce a 
database suitable for the user’s goals.  The usefulness of this procedure is obvious; the 
user can quickly generate a database of properties with their corresponding zoning and 
elevation attributes.  Furthermore, relationships are readily apparent.  The user can 
quickly see where all of the “heavy industrial” properties in the dataset are located in 
relation to rivers, roads and single family residences.  One can quickly infer how many 
professionals including economists, city planners and environmentalists among others 




XIV. APPENDIX 279 
 
. sum if saledate>=197001 & landval>=10000 & saleprice>0 & area>=500 &  
accountedarea>=61307803 & accountedarea<=113857350 & sphatFinalR 
> ESRatio>=.13 & sphatFinalRESRatio<=2.26  
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
  fid_export |    243549    56885.01    34542.03          0     156473 
        area |    243549    27862.41    137261.3    509.489    6397417 
        tlid |         0 
         rno |         0 
   ownersort |         0 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      owner1 |         0 
      owner2 |         0 
      owner3 |         0 
   owneraddr |         0 
   ownercity |         0 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    ownerzip |         0 
   sitestrno |    243549    8827.169    8377.012          0      90184 
    siteaddr |         0 
    sitecity |         0 
     landval |    243549    108707.7    98402.46      10000   1.32e+07 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     bldgval |    243549    157587.6    268271.2          0   5.04e+07 
    totalval |    243549    266322.8    327926.3      10000   5.19e+07 
    bldgsqft |    243549    1949.495    2905.372          0     289168 
   a_t_acres |    243549     .470286    5.941891          0       2500 
   yearbuilt |    243549    1865.829     446.328          0       2030 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   prop_code |         0 
     landuse |         0 
     taxcode |         0 
    saledate |    243540    199906.5     547.659     197009     202509 
   saleprice |    243549    201059.1    177364.1        390   1.15e+07 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      county |         0 
     x_coord |    243549     7643747    45798.32    7480152    7881360 
     y_coord |    243549    662042.4    29179.18     479032     776799 
           x |    243549     7643747    45798.43    7480154    7881361 
           y |    243549    108962.8    251488.1          0   776985.2 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
  fid_zoning |    243549    10571.46    5283.752          1      18859 
      area_1 |    243549    2.31e+08    2.58e+09   1975.051   3.77e+10 
     city_no |    243549    556.6111     410.556          5       1245 
        city |         0 
        zone |         0 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
  zone_class |         0 
  zonegen_cl |         0 
    describe |         0 
           X |    243549     7643747    45798.32    7480152    7881360 
                                                 
79 Those variables that are coded in text format are displayed as a single zero. 
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           Y |    243549    662042.4    29179.18     479032     776799 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    resdummy |    234684           1           0          1          1 
zone1count~l |    243549    7.463857    30.79248          0        226 
zone1newar~n |    243549    227570.1    828904.5          0    7813642 
zone2count~l |    243549    26.75145     54.6434          0        368 
zone2newar~n |    243549     1058345     1985438          0   1.39e+07 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone3count~l |    243549    2.737334    6.848936          0         47 
zone3newar~n |    243549    142517.8    720515.4          0   1.14e+07 
zone4count~l |    243549     3.71329    10.38144          0         90 
zone4newar~n |    243549    160730.1      497534          0    8622538 
zone5count~l |    243549    18.46732    41.62763          0        495 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone5newar~n |    243549     8720456    1.81e+07          0   1.13e+08 
zone6count~l |    243549    4.889977    20.23693          0        323 
zone6newar~n |    243549    716768.2     2392868          0   3.13e+07 
zone7count~l |    243549    28.85511    56.51019          0        475 
zone7newar~n |    243549     2594351     4755724          0   7.20e+07 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone8count~l |    243549    23.58349    80.71974          0        631 
zone8newar~n |    243549    436721.2     1279403          0    8715404 
zone9count~l |    243549    120.6776    269.6661          0       1976 
zone9newar~n |    243549     1249013     2495901          0   3.23e+07 
zone10coun~l |    243549    73.93641     142.193          0        831 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone10newa~n |    243549     1130941     1912331          0   1.14e+07 
zone11coun~l |    243549    144.1703    286.2856          0       1689 
zone11newa~n |    243549     1536735     2890062          0   1.99e+07 
zone12coun~l |    243549    4.788449    29.17704          0        422 
zone12newa~n |    243549    187538.2     1137362          0   1.54e+07 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone13coun~l |    243549    .1023121    1.132581          0         17 
zone13newa~n |    243549    2672.034    26825.19          0   393054.8 
zone14coun~l |    243549    66.83528    150.9801          0       1167 
zone14newa~n |    243549    622516.7     1265623          0    7273134 
zone15coun~l |    243549    17.16552    33.55596          0        289 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone15newa~n |    243549     1660616     3723012          0   5.09e+07 
zone16coun~l |    243549    1.667894    14.31759          0        216 
zone16newa~n |    243549    84729.28    622255.7          0    7090447 
zone17coun~l |    243549    27.95566    240.8846          0       8416 
zone17newa~n |    243549    278492.3     1298543          0   2.21e+07 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone18coun~l |    243549    81.06785    196.9272          0       1107 
zone18newa~n |    243549    856591.9     2028264          0   1.38e+07 
zone19coun~l |    243549    3.319681    16.36024          0        156 
zone19newa~n |    243549    78735.83      334238          0    2647435 
zone20coun~l |    243549    34.80341     102.639          0        895 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone20newa~n |    243549    664009.7     1656677          0   1.41e+07 
zone21coun~l |    243549    51.15259    105.6757          0        666 
zone21newa~n |    243549    882250.7     1585941          0   1.71e+07 
zone22coun~l |    243549    3.589931    15.95573          0        161 
zone22newa~n |    243549    197213.4    797342.1          0    9930635 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone23coun~l |    243549    31.40146    93.21279          0        581 
96 
zone23newa~n |    243549    662122.2     1848216          0   1.14e+07 
zone24coun~l |    243549    37.31871    127.6472          0       1523 
zone24newa~n |    243549    774621.6     1809900          0   1.69e+07 
zone25coun~l |    243549    33.54281      84.531          0        725 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone25newa~n |    243549    358132.6    997361.2          0   1.42e+07 
zone26coun~l |    243549     3.49278    8.590918          0         81 
zone26newa~n |    243549    786053.2     1910493          0   1.52e+07 
zone27coun~l |    243549     12.8661    27.92395          0        295 
zone27newa~n |    243549     2596951     4809339          0   5.49e+07 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone28coun~l |    243549    49.98727    122.3736          0       1266 
zone28newa~n |    243549     4992637    1.05e+07          0   8.21e+07 
zone29coun~l |    243549    6.520905    42.06011          0        518 
zone29newa~n |    243549    213102.9     1394911          0   2.35e+07 
zone30coun~l |    243549    26.33167    92.54264          0        837 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone30newa~n |    243549      273445    841003.5          0    7094959 
zone31coun~l |    243549    6.496167    46.03036          0        491 
zone31newa~n |    243549    107503.4    756388.5          0    9567984 
zone32coun~l |    243549    34.41991    122.7899          0       1292 
zone32newa~n |    243549    450339.5     1468233          0   1.42e+07 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone33coun~l |    243549    177.2126    512.3896          0       3682 
zone33newa~n |    243549     1024203     2849035          0   2.11e+07 
zone34coun~l |    243549    24.50969    99.56983          0        796 
zone34newa~n |    243549    241843.7     1002799          0    8295679 
zone35coun~l |    243549    1.745817    24.24052          0        382 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone35newa~n |    243549    32103.33    438866.4          0    7766547 
zone36coun~l |    243549     43.5292    133.0325          0       1388 
zone36newa~n |    243549     1325194     3930478          0   3.26e+07 
zone37coun~l |    243549    5.762372      31.569          0        300 
zone37newa~n |    243549    126405.7    661151.1          0    7143650 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone38coun~l |    243549      419.82    689.4599          0       3853 
zone38newa~n |    243549     7113849    1.14e+07          0   6.06e+07 
zone39coun~l |    243549    1080.119    1198.365          0       5106 
zone39newa~n |    243549    1.23e+07    1.38e+07          0   5.78e+07 
zone40coun~l |    243549    538.2093    927.7871          0       4468 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone40newa~n |    243549     7203762    1.26e+07          0   7.78e+07 
zone41coun~l |    243549    960.6798     1751.63          0       9023 
zone41newa~n |    243549     6929648    1.11e+07          0   5.07e+07 
zone42coun~l |    243549    29.58908    139.4538          0       1172 
zone42newa~n |    243549    304344.6     1349390          0   1.17e+07 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
zone43coun~l |    243549    99.57645     250.099          0       1619 
zone43newa~n |    243549     1288466     2889177          0   1.77e+07 
     ffdummy |    243549    .0363992    .1872818          0          1 
 mergezoning |    243549           3           0          3          3 
distdowntown |    243549    50502.87    27802.11   3637.083   251819.3 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
mergedownt~n |    243549           3           0          3          3 
  distancecn |    243549     11989.1    12121.17   35.01216   129959.9 
     mergecn |    243549           3           0          3          3 
  distancecg |    243549    8352.038    8110.835   38.12783   58724.84 
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     mergecg |    243549           3           0          3          3 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
 distfreeart |    243549    2360.807    2140.419   10.10832   58805.21 
mergefreeart |    243549           3           0          3          3 
disthospital |    243549    17811.61    15659.89   204.7304   186877.3 
mergehospi~l |    243549           3           0          3          3 
   distparks |    243549    1331.924     2719.65   1.817504    52921.5 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
  mergeparks |    243549           3           0          3          3 
  distrivers |    243549     9510.69    7073.683   6.783214   32943.23 
 mergerivers |    243549           3           0          3          3 
 distschools |    243549    2485.373    2541.185    .586172   43214.51 
mergeschools |    243549           3           0          3          3 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
distUGBdis~e |    243549    2936.287     12776.6          0   171421.3 
mergeugbdi~e |    243549           3           0          3          3 
         UGB |    243549    .9069386     .290519          0          1 
  mergeugb10 |    243549           3           0          3          3 
distrailro~s |    243549    9500.428    12367.62    21.7613   156547.7 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
mergerailr~s |    243549           3           0          3          3 
accounteda~a |    243549    7.26e+07     5901356   6.13e+07   1.13e+08 
     disDTSQ |    243549    3.32e+09    4.42e+09   1.32e+07   6.34e+10 
     discnSQ |    243549    2.91e+08    7.43e+08   1225.851   1.69e+10 
     discgSQ |    243549    1.36e+08    2.81e+08   1453.731   3.45e+09 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
disfreeartSQ |    243549    1.02e+07    3.02e+07   102.1781   3.46e+09 
dishospita~Q |    243549    5.62e+08    1.66e+09   41914.55   3.49e+10 
  disparksSQ |    243549     9170491    8.45e+07    3.30332   2.80e+09 
 disriversSQ |    243549    1.40e+08    1.88e+08   46.01199   1.09e+09 
disschoolsSQ |    243549    1.26e+07    4.77e+07   .3435976   1.87e+09 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    disUGBSQ |    243549    1.72e+08    1.21e+09          0   2.94e+10 
disrailroa~Q |    243549    2.43e+08    1.08e+09   473.5543   2.45e+10 
       Y1970 |    243549    .0000123    .0035097          0          1 
       Y1971 |    243549    .0000164    .0040526          0          1 
       Y1972 |    243549     .000037    .0060788          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       Y1973 |    243549    .0000164    .0040526          0          1 
       Y1974 |    243549    .0000287    .0053611          0          1 
       Y1975 |    243549    .0000164    .0040526          0          1 
       Y1976 |    243549    .0000328    .0057312          0          1 
       Y1977 |    243549    .0000164    .0040526          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       Y1978 |    243549    .0018559    .0430401          0          1 
       Y1979 |    243549    .0023691    .0486161          0          1 
       Y1980 |    243549    .0017656    .0419815          0          1 
       Y1981 |    243549    .0015479    .0393135          0          1 
       Y1982 |    243549    .0011456    .0338268          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       Y1983 |    243549     .002944    .0541785          0          1 
       Y1984 |    243549    .0034942    .0590082          0          1 
       Y1985 |    243549     .005502    .0739711          0          1 
       Y1986 |    243549    .0100062    .0995295          0          1 
       Y1987 |    243549    .0099857    .0994284          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       Y1988 |    243549    .0136851    .1161805          0          1 
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       Y1989 |    243549     .019376    .1378428          0          1 
       Y1990 |    243549    .0196059     .138642          0          1 
       Y1991 |    243549    .0186698    .1353561          0          1 
       Y1992 |    243549    .0240362     .153162          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       Y1993 |    243549    .0314187    .1744469          0          1 
       Y1994 |    243549    .0345228    .1825682          0          1 
       Y1995 |    243549    .0346008     .182767          0          1 
       Y1996 |    243549    .0426074    .2019708          0          1 
       Y1997 |    243549    .0465902    .2107599          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       Y1998 |    243549     .054486    .2269746          0          1 
       Y1999 |    243549    .0575695    .2329281          0          1 
       Y2000 |    243549    .0580212     .233784          0          1 
       Y2001 |    243549    .0721415    .2587227          0          1 
       Y2002 |    243549    .0824434    .2750396          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       Y2003 |    243549    .1037943    .3049942          0          1 
       Y2004 |    243549    .1276909     .333746          0          1 
       Y2005 |    243549    .1179065     .322498          0          1 
    Percent1 |    243549    .0031216    .0114594          0   .1202416 
    Percent2 |    243549    .0146439    .0276954          0   .2070365 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    Percent3 |    243549     .001963    .0098395          0   .1607802 
    Percent4 |    243549    .0022463    .0069198          0   .1198988 
    Percent5 |    243549    .1093008    .2211505          0          1 
    Percent6 |    243549    .0099657    .0333077          0   .4502914 
    Percent7 |    243549    .0364282    .0669016          0   .7358325 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    Percent8 |    243549    .0060722    .0178718          0   .1385102 
    Percent9 |    243549    .0173736    .0345717          0   .3591626 
   Percent10 |    243549    .0154097    .0260008          0   .1542803 
   Percent11 |    243549    .0226232    .0424584          0   .2741987 
   Percent12 |    243549    .0025724    .0152208          0   .2077377 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   Percent13 |    243549    .0000398    .0004061          0   .0064075 
   Percent14 |    243549     .009238    .0187667          0   .1008227 
   Percent15 |    243549     .022982    .0498378          0   .6546307 
   Percent16 |    243549    .0011293    .0081416          0   .0958564 
   Percent17 |    243549    .0041916    .0198343          0   .3599313 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   Percent18 |    243549    .0117831    .0281717          0   .2007914 
   Percent19 |    243549    .0011111     .004796          0   .0431639 
   Percent20 |    243549     .009117    .0227193          0   .1920538 
   Percent21 |    243549    .0128556    .0232923          0   .2552862 
   Percent22 |    243549    .0027611    .0112125          0   .1441226 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   Percent23 |    243549    .0091114    .0254716          0   .1630658 
   Percent24 |    243549    .0109626    .0248884          0   .2308946 
  Percent25 |    243549    .0053922    .0150498          0   .2316258 
   Percent26 |    243549    .0106076    .0255075          0   .1977729 
   Percent27 |    243549    .0371416    .0677431          0    .713482 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   Percent28 |    243549    .0637276    .1314749          0   .9924515 
   Percent29 |    243549    .0028241    .0183232          0   .3404168 
   Percent30 |    243549    .0037971    .0117191          0    .102167 
   Percent31 |    243549    .0013945    .0098679          0   .1334902 
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   Percent32 |    243549    .0061494    .0200045          0   .1973806 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   Percent33 |    243549    .0157361    .0442131          0   .3248344 
   Percent34 |    243549    .0032836    .0136586          0   .1127999 
   Percent35 |    243549    .0004087    .0056171          0   .1072034 
   Percent36 |    243549    .0179826    .0526046          0   .4354658 
   Percent37 |    243549    .0016763    .0087242          0   .0928112 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   Percent38 |    243549    .0979863    .1570429          0   .8778071 
   Percent39 |    243549    .1731967    .1936279          0   .7897637 
   Percent40 |    243549    .0968661    .1680775          0   .9914147 
   Percent41 |    243549    .1032269    .1698832          0   .8227973 
   Percent42 |    243549    .0041072     .018234          0   .1634976 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   Percent43 |    243549    .0174925     .039375          0   .2512791 
    SFRdummy |    243549    .8032552    .3975386          0          1 
    MFRdummy |    243549    .0743752     .262381          0          1 
    MURdummy |    243549      .04542     .208224          0          1 
   RRFUdummy |    243549    .0405504    .1972465          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     FFdummy |    243549    .0363992    .1872818          0          1 
      areaSQ |    243549    1.96e+10    4.63e+11     259579   4.09e+13 
  bldgsqftSQ |    243549    1.22e+07    4.50e+08          0   8.36e+10 
   elevation |    243549    307.8912    211.9364          0       4035 
mergeeleva~n |    243549           3           0          3          3 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
  PercentSFR |    243549    .5461281    .2353905          0          1 
  PercentMFR |    243549    .0733289    .0701039          0   .3629605 
  PercentMUR |    243549    .0684148    .0827876          0   .5310754 
sphatFinal~S |    243549    259898.8    228005.9   1465.515    6210495 
sphatFinal~o |    243549    .8656326    .4038525   .1300145   2.259957 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
PercentIDUST |    243549    .0463939    .0808569          0   .7358325 
SFRareawit~n |    243549    3.90e+07    1.67e+07          0   7.78e+07 
MFRareawit~n |    243549     5166138     4932958          0   3.23e+07 
MURareawit~n |    243549     4836899     5919342          0   4.08e+07 
INDUSTarea~n |    243549     3311119     5742806          0   7.20e+07 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
 PercentCCCO |    243549    .0053679     .015267          0   .1898668 
 PercentCOMM |    243549    .0219748     .035263          0   .2955199 
Percent~R123 |    243549    .0224831    .0657621          0   .5922169 
Percent~t123 |    243549     .523645    .2319968          0   .9914147 
 
 
XV. APPENDIX 3 
 
The complete set of filters used in the analysis section is as follow: 
 
Saledate>=197001 & saleprice~=0 & landval>=10000 & area>=500 & 
sphatYearRESRatio>=.28 & sphatYearRESRatio<=1.57 & 
AccountedArea>=61307804 & AccountedArea<=113857350 & 




In the end, these filters will make the data analysis much more significant and less 
biased.  The first filter, Saledate>=197001, allows only those properties that have been 
sold since the first month of 1970.  Many of the properties that have sold before this time 
and never been resold have very incomplete data likely due to less meticulous data 
collection.  Furthermore, this takes care of properties that have no sale date whatsoever 
which would be of no use to me.  Next, saleprice~=0, maintains that only those 
properties with recorded sales prices will be allowed in the analysis because this data is 
crucial for determining the effect zoning changes have on market prices.  
landval>=10000 and area>=500 exclude observations with recorded land values of less 
than $10,000 and areas of less than 500 square feet.  It is highly likely that properties 
with such low values and areas are developable due to the size or undesirability of the 
land.  Or, these filters could be excluding data errors.  Notably, condominiums with 
individual owners have a recorded land value of zero so that they will be excluded.  This 
is good; these types of owners, in contrast to the principle owners of the entire building, 
have never been Measure 37 claimants.  The owners of entire apartments, on the other 
hand, are listed along with adequate land values and areas under the MFR zoning.  
sphatYearRESRatio>=.28 & sphatYearRESRatio<=1.57 represent a proxy that 
eliminates observations where the given sales price differs greatly from an estimated, 
expected sales price.  This was accomplished in two steps.  First, a regression was 
completed whereby the average sales price was estimated for residential properties based 
upon various factors that make each of these pieces of land unique.80  Then, a ratio was 
created where the given sales price was divided by the estimated sales price so that a 
value of 1 indicates the property sold for exactly what it was expected to sell for.  The 
                                                 
80 See Appendix 4 for a complete discussion of regression analysis. 
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most extreme ratio values, those less than the 5th and greater than the 95th percentiles are 
excluded by this filter.  Consequently, this should exclude observations with sales prices 
that are not market driven, such as sales between friends or inheritances.  Therefore, only 
“arms-length” transactions between traditional buyers and sellers are included.  The last 
exclusion, AccountedArea>=61307804 & AccountedArea<=113857350, is based upon 
the Zone Area variables.81  In a circle of radius one mile, there are roughly 87 million 
square feet.  These variables count the square footage of zoning surrounding every 
property; during the data collection, the precise number of square feet was not calculated 
for every property, the reason being discussed in Appendix 5.  This filter only allows 
those observations where the “accounted area” is between 70 and 130 percent of the 
perfect amount.  AccountedAreaQuarter>=3831737 & 
AccountedAreaQuarter<=7116084 have the same meaning, except that they eliminate 




XVI. APPENDIX 4 
 
 Regression analysis, a statistical tool used by economists, will allow me to 
effectively analyze the data in order to achieve the objectives of this thesis.  Sometimes 
regression analysis is referred to as econometrics.  Simply put, the fundamental purpose 
of this tool 
is concerned with the study of the dependence of one variable, the 
dependent variable, on one or more other variables, the explanatory 
variables, with a view to estimating and/or predicting the (population) 
                                                 
81 See Appendix 5 for a detailed discussion of these variables. 
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mean or value of the former in terms of the known or fixed (in repeated 
sampling) values of the latter.82 
 
 In other words, econometrics is a way to statistically measure how much 
certain factors affect or influence that value in which your interest lies.  For 
example, one could attempt to predict the population mean of adult male heights 
(the dependent variable) based upon a number of explanatory factors.  These 
explanatory factors could include the father’s height and the mother’s height.  
Obviously, it would be nearly impossible to estimate the adult height of a 
newborn just using one set of parental heights.  Therefore, a large sample of 
parental heights and the associated height of adult male offspring is created.  A 
sample is needed because it would be nearly impossible to measure the height of 
every parent-son combination in the world.   
Regression analysis could then be used to tell us how the average height of 
sons increase (or decrease) with the parent’s height.  Then, we could take the 
measurement of one set of parents and predict the adult height of the son based 
upon the affect of parental height.  The son’s estimated adult height is based upon 
the average height of adult males given a set of parents with the same height as 
the son.  Therefore, the explanatory variables (parental heights) are assumed fixed 
or known while the dependent variable (the son’s adult height) is assumed random 
and statistical; it is uncertain how tall the son will actually be.  If he is average, 
then he will be very close to the predicted height.   
The beauty of regression analysis lies in the ability to determine by what value 
(positive or negative) the explanatory variables will affect the dependent variable.  By 
                                                 
82 Gujarati, Damodar.  Basic Econometrics.  McGraw Hill, New York: 2003.  The italics are the author’s. 
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corollary, one could determine if an explanatory variable has no affect at all.  It is also 
important to remember that a statistical relationship does not imply causation.  Just 
because a relationship exists does not mean that two variables are affecting each other.  
Much of this problem can be solved using a priori common sense considerations as well 
as economic theory.  The process of econometrics will become apparent in the analysis 
section of this thesis. 
In this narrative, the heights of the parents are being controlled for.  Thus, given 
two identical children, regression analysis gives the researcher a measurement of how 
much taller one child is likely to be given that his father is one inch taller than the other 
child’s father. 
 
XVII. APPENDIX 5 
 
 
Zone Count and Zone Area: Quarter and Full Mile Radius 
 When each file in the RLIS Lite dataset is opened in ArcMap, the user can access 
both a spatial layout of the data and an “attribute table” which is the spreadsheet format 
of the same data.  The spreadsheet form of the data is important because a single, 
organized spreadsheet is a necessary condition for regression estimation.  Unfortunately, 
the zoning data for each property is not included in the same file as the general tax lot 
property data (non-asterisk variables).  Under this condition, it is possible to visually 
ascertain the zoning belonging to any given property although this relationship does not 
appear in a common spreadsheet. 
 The tools of ArcMap were used to solve this problem.  First of all, I converted 
every property into a single point on the map using a tool called “Feature to Point.”  The 
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software calculated the center-most point within each property and displayed it on a map.  
Then, I overlaid the RLIS Lite zoning file and asked the software to tell me the zone 
classification that fell over each point using the “Identity” tool.  After making the 
calculations, ArcMap created an output spreadsheet and spatial file with the property data 
and the zoning data combined.  This output could be easily verified as correct by looking 
at the two original data layers stacked upon each other.  It must be noted that there are 
some properties that are legally split by two zones.  Therefore, the method used here 
would only produce one zone for these properties (whichever zone is located where the 
point is).  Fortunately, a visual survey of the spatial data confirmed that this occurrence is 
rare. 
 Before working any further with the zoning data, I gave each of the 43 zone 
classifications a numerical identification in order to eliminate confusion.  Each of the 
zone types along with their corresponding ID were defined in TABLE 2 of the data 
section. 
 Once the various zones were defined numerically, I created the Zone Count and 
Zone Area variables with the help of a colleague, Ryan Sullivan.  The creation of these 
two variables was crucial to the analysis presented in this thesis; a detailed description of 
the methodology used to derive these variables is below.  Zone Count gives me the total 
number properties of each zoning classification within a one mile radius of very property 
within the dataset.  Zone Area takes each of the properties in Zone Count and adds up the 











 The importance of this data will become apparent in the analysis section of the 
thesis.  Using regression analysis and while controlling for environmental and structural 
attributes, I can find the change in land value from a one square foot increase in 
commercial land within a mile radius of any given property, for example.  Or, I could put 
everything in percentage terms and find the effect of a one percent increase in a certain 
zone classification.  This will allow me to make an argument whether changing the 
zoning make-up surrounding a given piece of property from low density residential to 
high density or commercial property has a negative effect on the land value of that 
                                                 
83 This is a visual representation of the Zone Count and Zone Area variables for one property (the dots 
represent the center-most point of each property).  The blue circles have a measured quarter mile and full 
mile radius.  Zone Count gives us the number of properties of each type of zone classification within the 
blue lines and Zone Area gives us the areas of each type of zone. 
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property.  This is analogous to the situation if one of your neighbors won a Measure 37 
lawsuit and was suddenly allowed to develop their land.  Consequently, the state would 
have to change the zoning of the disputed property from low density to high density, 
commercial or industrial.   
 These variables will tell me whether your neighbor’s use of their property has a 
negative or positive effect on your land value, depending on the circumstance.  A quarter 
mile radius was used because this is the distance at which the author believes some of the 
greatest amenity effects lay.  A one mile radius, although arbitrarily determined, was used 
as the outer bound because that is the likely furthest distance that most land uses will 
have any effect on your own property value.  Noise, traffic, pollution or the lack thereof 
are likely going to have the greatest effects on land value.  These effects will be largest 
within the quarter mile radius and less so in the “donut” area comprising of the area 
further than a quarter mile and less than a full mile.  This author contends that the effects 
these factors could pose will be miniscule when occurring one mile or more from your 
property. 
Zone Count and Zone Area were derived using a program written by Ryan in 
Stata, a statistical software package.84  Recall that the intent of the program was to find 
the zoning make-up in the immediate vicinity of every property in the dataset.  The 
program would run in a loop.  It took the first property in the database and then calculated 
the distance to every other property in the entire database.  The distances were calculated 
using a well-known geometric formula which makes use of the X and Y coordinates 
                                                 
84 See Appendix 7 for the complete script of this program. 
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found in the RLIS Lite dataset.85  Then, the program would make note of those properties 
whose distance is less than or equal to 5,280 feet.  Of those properties, it would then tally 
how many are of each type of zone (1 through 43).  The program would record this 
number, as well as the areas of these properties in a column corresponding to the original 
property in question.  Finally, it would move on to the second property in the database. 
 The amount of calculation involved in this entire process should be evident, 
especially considering that it was repeated 556,102 times for every property in the 
database.  Therefore, the database was divided into three sections to improve efficiency.  
This was accomplished by splitting it vertically into fragments containing roughly equal 
numbers of properties using the X coordinates.  A “buffer” of one mile was placed on the 
sides of the fragments where more properties were present.  Those properties on the 
fringes would, therefore, contain data for all the zoning within the one mile radius.  
Fortunately, this process was completed in roughly two weeks using one of the fastest 
computers at the University of Oregon. 
 Unfortunately, this methodology does produce a problem with the accounted area.  
The area of a given property is counted within a mile radius of a certain other property if 
the centermost-point (created by “Feature to Point”) is within a mile.  However, there are 
cases in which the point is within a mile but much of the area of the property is not.  
Conversely, this is balanced by the fact that sometimes part of the property is within a 
mile but the point is not.  See FIGURE 5.  Admittedly, this is not an exact science.  Also, 
properties on the edge of the dataset lie next to emptiness as far as the data is concerned 
so a lot of area is not accounted for.  This is corrected by using a filter that throws out 
                                                 
85 Given two points (X1, Y1) and (X2, Y2), the distance between these two points is:  d= √{(X2-X1)2 + 
(Y2-Y1)2} 
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those properties whose accounted area is far greater or less than the 87,582,600 square 
feet found in a circle of a mile radius.  It should be of no alarm if the accounted area does 
not add to this figure exactly; there is a lot of area, such as streets and rivers that is not 
counted because it is neither zoned nor does it occur within any property. 






Distance to Downtown Portland 
 The process behind calculating the distance to downtown Portland was rather 
simple using the ArcMap software.  First of all, I decided it would be easiest to calculate 
the distances using points so that I could use the same formula that was used in finding 
                                                 
86 Figure 5 displays a portion of the circle of radius one mile represented by the red line.  The property that 
lies slightly below and to the left of marker “1” is an example of a property that will be fully counted in the 
Zone Count and Zone Area data yet is not completely contained within the circle’s perimeter.  The property 
that marker “2” lies above is an example of a property that will not be counted in the Zone Count and Zone 




the Zone Count variables.  In RLIS Lite, Portland City Hall (on Second Avenue, in the 
midst of downtown) is labeled as a single point.  For the property data, I used the point 
output file that I found earlier using the “Feature to Point” tool.  Therefore, I was left 
with finding the distance between the one city hall point and every property point that 
were lying spatially on top of one another but were located in two different files.  There is 
no straightforward tool in ArcMap for finding the distance between points from different 
files.  Fortunately, there is a freeware program called Hawth’s Tools which does.87 
 Hawth’s Tools is an assortment of useful programs designed for ArcMap.  I used 
a specific tool called “Distance between Points between Layers.”  This tool gave me an 
Excel file of all the distances along with the unique TLID variable so properties in the 
original RLIS Lite dataset could be appropriately matched up with this distance 
calculation. 
 It must be noted that this tool calculates distances “as the crow flies” (the shortest 
distance between two points) meaning it does not consider the driving distance to 
downtown Portland, for example.  This can cause some problems, but it is likely that they 
will be small.  The distance to the city should be relative.  For the most part, a property 
that is further from the city hall relative to another will have a longer drive.  Only access 
to high speed roadways could change this but this factor will be controlled for in the 
regressions due to a separate calculation for distance to freeways and highways.  Lastly, 
noise and pollution travel “as the crow flies” as well and do not meander along roadways. 
Distance to CN and CG 
                                                 
87 Beyer, H. L. 2004. Hawth's Analysis Tools for ArcGIS. Available at 
http://www.spatialecology.com/htools. 
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 Collecting the distances to the CN and CG zones was almost identical to the 
process of collecting the city hall distances discussed above.  In this instance, the CN and 
CG zones were not apart of their own RLIS Lite file but were combined with every other 
type of zone in the dataset.  I solved this problem by using the “Select by Attributes” 
function in ArcMap which allowed me to select and then export the proper commercial 
zones into a custom created layer.   
 Then, using all the tax lots in the dataset as points once again, I used the Hawth’s 
Tools function “Distance between Points between Layers” which gave me the distance to 
the nearest CN property and CG property.  TLID was used to match the distance output 
file with the original data.  Again, this estimate only considers the absolute shortest 
distance between the two points.  The concerns and the justifications behind using this 
method remain consistent with those expressed in the distance to downtown 
methodology. 
Distance to Hospitals 
I calculated the distances to the nearest hospital with the same process utilized for 
finding the downtown distances.  The hospitals were originally represented as isolated 
points in RLIS Lite.  Again, I used the Hawth’s Tools function, “Distance between Points 
between Layers” which gave me the distance to the nearest hospital for every property in 
the dataset.  TLID was used to match the distance output file with the original data.  The 
concerns and the justifications behind using this method remain consistent with those 
expressed in the distance to downtown methodology. 
Distances to Schools 
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The distances to schools were calculated using the same method as the distance to 
downtown Portland.  Schools were originally represented as points in RLIS Lite so I 
layered the property point data that I created over the school data and used the Hawth’s 
Tools function, “Distance between Points between Layers.”  TLID was used to match the 
original data to the calculated distances.  The concerns and the justifications behind using 
the “as the crow flies” methodology remain consistent with those expressed in the 
distance to downtown methodology. 
Distance Free-Art 
This variable measures the effect that a freeway or major road arterial can have on 
a given piece of property.  In the dataset, freeways are defined as interstate highways 
including Interstate 5, 205, and 84.  Major arterials include intrastate highways including 
Oregon Highways 99, 26, 30, and 8.  The freeways can be included in the same variable 
as the arterials because in this instance they are all multi-lane roads used heavily by 
commuters throughout the city.  Since Interstate 5 is only four lanes wide throughout the 
Portland area, all the roads are roughly the same size.   
Calculating the distance to the nearest freeway or arterial was harder than any of 
the prior computations.  The roadways are represented as lines in RLISLite that 
unfortunately do not contain data on entrance points.  I wished to find the distance from 
every property to the nearest point on a road.  I debated placing points along the lines 
which were dispersed according to the average number of feet between an on-ramp or 
road entrance.  This would have given me the story behind road access, but I would have 
missed the externalities because some properties would appear much further from a road, 
depending on where they lie in relation to an on-ramp.  Therefore, I decided to place 
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points (which would allow me to use Hawth’s Tools) as close as possible along each road 
in order to get a true measurement of how far a property is from these roads.  It is further 
reasonable to assume that, for the most part, properties closest to major roads will be 
nearest to entrances relative to those properties further away.  It is also reasonable to 
assume that properties nearest to these roads will receive more externalities relative to 
those that are not. 
 Unfortunately, I did not have the expertise or time to calculate the distance to 
continuous points along the road data layers.  I created a grid with squares of 500 feet by 
500 feet and placed it on top of the road data.  I used 500 feet because this was the 
smallest grid size that the computer could computationally handle given the dataset.  
Then, I found the points where the gridlines and the road lines cross using the “Intersect” 
tool in ArcMap.  Since the roads are not perfectly straight, points were created at various 
intervals but no more than 500 feet apart.  Those properties lying next to a road, while 
they may not be estimated perfectly, will not show a distance greater than 500 feet.  See 
FIGURE 6.  Again, since there are few residential properties located on the shoulders of 




















 Finally, I used the Hawth’s Tools function, “Distance between Points between 
Layers.”  TLID was used to match the distance output file with the original data.  Please 
see FIGURE 7 and its footnote for a further justification of the combined usage of the 












                                                 
88 In Figure 6, the green squares are the 500 foot grid.  It is easy to see that due to the curvature of the road, 
the blue points, which will be used to estimate the distance, are not placed in a consistent manner.  
However, none of the points are further apart than the side of one of the green boxes. 
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Distance to Parks 
This variable measures the effect that the distance to a park or open space has on 
land values.  This variable includes parks, golf courses, biking/hiking trails, community 
gardens and pools, cemeteries, school fields and fairgrounds.  In RLIS Lite, these areas 
are represented as geometric polygons much like the original property data.  The distance 
to these areas is quite important due to their potentially significant effect on land value. 
                                                 
89 In Figure 6, the major roadway is represented by the white lines while the properties are represented by 
the green polygons.  Their center-most point is also displayed.  A property located next to the 1 will not be 
estimated correctly because it will really be the distance to the blue interstate logo.  However, this property 
will show up as much closer relative to a property near the 2.  At 1 there are definitely more externalities.  
However, it is conceivable that 2 is closer to an on-ramp than 1.  This should not be a major problem 





 I used a methodology very similar to that used in calculating freeway distance in 
order to find the distance to parks and open space.  Finding the centermost points of the 
parks and calculating the distance to these would not have been adequate due to the large 
discrepancies in the size of parks in Portland.  Some parks, such as Forest Park, are 
thousands of feet wide while others are just a couple of hundred.  Therefore, it would 
appear that some properties were closer to parks in relation to others when that is not the 
case.  To solve this problem, I found the distance to the boundary of the parks. 
 Once again, I placed a grid of 500 feet over the park boundaries for the same 
reasons discussed with the freeways.  Then, I used the “Intersect” tool in ArcMap to find 
all the points where the grid and the park boundaries cross.  This gave me a good, but not 
perfect, representation of where the park boundaries are located.  I believe that the same 
relative distance justification applies here as it does to the freeway variable. 
 Finally, I used the Hawth’s Tools function, “Distance between Points between 
Layers,” to find the distance to the nearest park boundary for every property.  TLID was 
used to match the distance output file with the original data. 
 
Distance to Rivers 
 The variable “Distance to Rivers” measures the effect that proximity to a river can 
have on land values.  Rivers are defined here as major bodies including the Columbia, 
Willamette, Sandy and Clackamas Rivers as well as Smith, Bybee, Vancouver and 
Sturgeon Lakes and Lake Oswego.  It also includes smaller bodies including the Tualatin 
and Molalla Rivers and Johnson Creek.  Only large rivers and streams were used in this 
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study because they are most likely to provide a habitat for plants and animals and amiable 
views for humans.  The rivers are represented as lines in RLIS Lite, akin to the road data.   
 The methodology used to find the distance to rivers was exactly the same as that 
used to find the distance to freeways.  First, I created a grid consisting of squares with 
sides of 500 feet and layered it on top of the rivers data.  Utilizing the “Intersect” tool in 
ArcMap, I found every point where the grid and the rivers intersect.  Since these points 
did not fall continuously along the river lines, this was not a perfect representation of 
where the rivers are located.  However, none of the points were further apart than 500 
feet.  Furthermore, I believe that the same relative distance justification applies here as it 
does to the freeway variable. 
 Finally, I used the Hawth’s Tools function, “Distance between Points between 
Layers,” to find the distance from every property to the nearest river.  TLID was used to 
match the distance output file with the original data. 
 
UGB 
 This variable describes whether a given property lies within the urban growth 
boundary (UGB) or not.  Descriptive variables such as this are called “dummy variables” 
which only take the value of 1 or 0.  In this case, the value is 1 if the property is within 
the UGB and 0 if it does not.  The coefficient on this regressed variable will tell us the 
positive or negative effect exerted upon a property if it is included in the UGB.  By 
corollary, the coefficient is the entire estimated value difference between a property that 
is in the UGB and one that is not, holding all other factors constant. 
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 This variable was derived quite easily.  The UGB is defined as a border in RLIS 
Lite.  In ArcMap, I gave a value of 1 to those areas inside the border and a value of 0 
outside.  Then, I used the “Identity” tool which told me whether each property point 
should be identified with a 0 or 1. 
 
Distance to UGB 
 This variable measures the distance from each property to the Portland 
metropolitan urban growth boundary.  For those properties inside the boundary, the 
distance is recorded as zero.  It is clear from the discussion above that the UGB regulates 
where urban development is allowed and gives both homeowners and developers a sense 
of certainty regarding the present and future location of infrastructure.  It is also 
important to remember that the boundary is changed every five years in order to 
incorporate more land.  Therefore, it may be worthwhile to measure how proximity to the 
boundary affects land value. 
The “Distance to UGB” variable was derived using the same process as the 
“Distance to Parks” variable.  RLIS Lite represents the UGB as a single line boundary.  
Once again, I placed a grid of 500 feet over this boundary for the same reasons discussed 
earlier.  Then, I used the “Intersect” tool in ArcMap to find all the points where the grid 
and the UGB boundaries cross.  This gave me a good, but not perfect, representation of 
where the boundaries are located.  I believe that the same relative distance justification 
applies here as it does to the freeway variable. 
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 Finally, I used the Hawth’s Tools function, “Distance between Points between 
Layers,” to find the shortest distance to the UGB boundary for every property.  TLID was 
used to match the distance output file with the original data. 
 
Distance to Railroads 
This variable measures the nearest distance from each property to a heavy rail 
line.  The data in RLIS Lite only includes heavy commercial lines and does not count 
light rail lines used for public transportation.  Railroads are represented exactly the same 
as freeways in the dataset.   
 The methodology used to find the distance to railroads was exactly the same as 
that used to find the distance to freeways.  First, I created a grid consisting of squares 
with sides of 500 feet and layered it on top of the railroad data.  Utilizing the “Intersect” 
tool in ArcMap, I found every point where the grid and the railroads intersect.  Since 
these points did not fall continuously along the railroad lines, this was not a perfect 
representation of where the railroads are located.  However, none of the points were 
further apart than 500 feet due to the nature of the grid.  Furthermore, I believe that the 
same relative distance justification applies here as it does to the freeway variable. 
 Finally, I used the Hawth’s Tools function, “Distance between Points between 
Layers,” to find the distance from every property to the nearest railroad.  TLID was used 




This variable measures the elevation, in feet above sea level, of the centermost 
point of each property.  Elevation data is not present in RLIS Lite but I was able to obtain 
it from a GIS specialist at the University of Oregon, through the U.S. Geological 
Survey.90  It is represented by topographic satellite image which breaks the State of 
Oregon into a grid composed of 100 square foot areas.  The map is so precise that every 
one of these areas in Oregon is assigned an elevation value.   
Calculating the elevation of each property was a two stage process.  First of all, I 
needed to project the topographic elevation map in the same coordinate system as the 
properties so that they would line up perfectly on top of each other.  I accomplished this 
by using the “Project” tool in ArcMap.  I was able to determine that the data lined up 
because the rivers data was located where there were “trenches” of low-lying area 
surrounded by higher elevations.  Then, I used a freeware program called “GridSpot” to 
find the elevation.91  This program works by giving each property point an elevation 
value from the underlying topographic map.  Only the elevation of the centermost point 
in the property is reported.  This may be a problem for the largest of properties that have 
a large variance in elevation, but this occurrence appears rare.  Finally, the elevation data 




 Technically, the Year Dummies were created through regression analysis.  I used 
the variable “sales price” as the dependent variable and the 35 years of sale dates as the 
explanatory variables.  In the dataset, I used a 1 to indicate that the residence was sold in 
                                                 
90 U.S. Geological Survey, EROS Data Center.  “Oregon 10m DEM.”  Raster digital data, created in Sioux 
Falls, South Dakota, 1999. 
91 Rathert, Dan. 2004.  “GridSpot.”  Available at http://arcscripts.esri.com/details.asp?dbid=12773. 
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a given year and a 0 if it was not.  When creating numerous dummy variables, one must 
be careful to leave one of them out so that a perfect but misleading linear relationship 
does not occur among these variables.  The omitted dummy variable also becomes the 
variable to which all the other dummies are compared.   
 I have chosen to omit the 2005 dummy whenever the “Year Dummies” are used 
in the analysis section.  This means that the coefficients for all the other years should 
reflect their relationship to the sales price in 2005.  Therefore, I would expect all the 
coefficients to be negative and decreasing in a monotonic fashion into the past.  The year 
2005 should represent the highest sales prices due to inflation and increased demand so 
compared to its prices, the prices of prior years should be lower.  Coefficients are 
negative because we must subtract a dollar amount from today’s dollars to realize how 
much money would have bought a comparable residence in the past.   
 Simply, using a regression to control for changing purchasing power in the home 
market allows me to statistically estimate how sales prices fluctuate from year to year, 
everything else being equal.  It must be noted that the “Year Dummies” are not used in 
regressions estimating land value as the dependent variable because land value is an 
assessed value that is consistently updated for every property.  
121 
XVIII. APPENDIX 6 
 













XIX. APPENDIX 7 
 
 
/* Property Group Middle */ 
 
/* Setup */ 
clear 
set mem 200m 
use /home/harbaugh/Desktop/M37/replacedzoneswpriceanddate.dta 
 
set more off 
 
rename x_coord X 
rename y_coord Y 
drop zone 
rename zone_class zone 
 
 
drop if X <= 7622291 
drop if X >= 7668131 
 

















































set more off 
 
/* Generate the needed variables */ 
 
local zones = 44 
 
gen float distance = 0 
gen int withinboundary = 0 
 
local n = 1 
 
while `n'  < `zones' { 
 
gen int zone`n'countlocal = 0 
gen zone`n'newareawithin = 0 
 




/* The While Loop */ 
 
local i = 1 
 
while `i'  < 151289 { 
 
/* Check to see which properties are within specified radius */ 
 
replace withinboundary = ((sqrt((X - X[`i'])^2 + (Y - Y[`i'])^2)) < 
5281) 
 
/* Determine which zone types are within radius */ 
local m = 1 
while `m' < `zones' { 
 
summ area if (withinboundary ==1 & zone ==`m'), meanonly 
replace zone`m'countlocal = r(N) in `i' 
replace zone`m'newareawithin = r(sum) in `i' 
 
/* Next m */ 
 




/* Next i */ 
 




/* Drop uneeded variables */ 
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XX. APPENDIX 8 
 
REGRESSION SET 1 
 
 (1) (2) 
COEFFICIENT URBAN RURAL 
   
area 1.349** 1.036** 
 [0.012] [0.015] 
   
areaSQ -0.000000217** -0.000000151** 
 [6.15e-09] [3.29e-09] 
   
bldgsqft 43.55** 5.077 
 [0.15] [3.34] 
   
bldgsqftSQ -0.000158** 0.00352** 
 [0.00000091] [0.00055] 
   
distdowntown -1.101** -5.344** 
 [0.040] [0.87] 
   
disDTSQ 0.00000570** 0.0000189** 
 [0.00000037] [0.0000046] 
   
distfreeart 1.990** -3.861** 
 [0.20] [1.18] 
   
disfreeartSQ -0.000339** 0.000109* 
 [0.000023] [0.000060] 
   
disthospital 0.659** -0.278 
 [0.074] [0.68] 
   
dishospitalSQ 0.00000825** -0.00000716 
 [0.0000020] [0.0000089] 
   
distrivers 0.0284 -3.123* 
 [0.091] [1.29] 
   
disriversSQ 0.0000184** 0.000107* 
 [0.0000033] [0.000059] 
   
distschools 5.719** 7.589** 
 [0.22] [1.33] 
   
disschoolsSQ -0.000445** -0.000251** 
 [0.000019] [0.000048] 
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distUGBdistance -2.507** -1.161* 
 [0.16] [0.55] 
   
disUGBSQ -0.00000137 0.0000175* 
 [0.0000026] [0.0000097] 
   
elevation 107.1** 44.01** 
 [1.35] [7.95] 
   
UGB 16610** -48698** 
 [2214] [9396] 
   
Y1970 -515510** - 
 [64295] - 
   
Y1971 -210818** - 
 [45446] - 
   
Y1972 -229336** - 
 [24296] - 
   
Y1973 -232819** - 
 [37110] - 
   
Y1974 -193413** - 
 [45448] - 
   
Y1975 -187888** - 
 [64272] - 
   
Y1976 -246232** - 
 [32137] - 
   
Y1977 -245193** - 
 [32141] - 
   
Y1978 -214981** -294251** 
 [3611] [57226] 
   
Y1979 -206935** -291320** 
 [3198] [64486] 
   
Y1980 -204624** -273974** 
 [3653] [76151] 
   
Y1981 -199053** -274544** 
 [4081] [47860] 
   
Y1982 -207498** -243773** 
 [4765] [64692] 
   
Y1983 -218167** -322647** 
 [3030] [39485] 
   
Y1984 -217349** -300266** 
 [2713] [30751] 
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Y1985 -226067** -319266** 
 [2250] [32248] 
   
Y1986 -221216** -285841** 
 [1686] [23074] 
   
Y1987 -216752** -297402** 
 [1714] [21491] 
   
Y1988 -213273** -271093** 
 [1473] [20367] 
   
Y1989 -186383** -253679** 
 [1368] [21122] 
   
Y1990 -189535** -263963** 
 [1278] [14849] 
   
Y1991 -180110** -244941** 
 [1303] [15433] 
   
Y1992 -167817** -256031** 
 [1158] [15469] 
   
Y1993 -163619** -255795** 
 [1050] [13423] 
   
Y1994 -144026** -216628** 
 [997] [12999] 
   
Y1995 -130567** -223156** 
 [989] [12197] 
   
Y1996 -120458** -188968** 
 [895] [11749] 
   
Y1997 -103641** -175218** 
 [860] [11464] 
   
Y1998 -98507** -161808** 
 [813] [10502] 
   
Y1999 -90196** -150422** 
 [791] [10622] 
   
Y2000 -86208** -138340** 
 [793] [10712] 
   
Y2001 -78252** -137180** 
 [732] [10285] 
   
Y2002 -72332** -123364** 
 [705] [9861] 
   
Y2003 -60098** -126785** 
 [659] [9276] 
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Y2004 -33806** -64910** 
 [626] [8720] 
   
LUMFRdummy 29455**  
 [2527]  
LUAGRdummy  16427** 
  [5928] 
   
LUFORdummy  -32087** 
  [6373] 




 [21.6] [404] 
PercentDNSFRnot123 -213.3** -1741* 
 [35.2] [844] 
   
PercentMFRQuart -528.1** -474.7 
 [25.8] [511] 
   
PercentDNMFR -1570** -3802* 
 [43.6] [1723] 
   
PercentMURQuart -628.8** 2982** 
 [25.7] [1054] 
   
PercentDNMUR -336.4** 12990** 
 [40.9] [2954] 
   
PercentINDUSTQuart -740.5** -1476 
 [34.2] [1027] 
   
PercentDNINDUST -20.55 1262 
 [42.1] [1220] 
   
PercentCCQuart -538.4** 204374 
 [84.8] [198906] 
   
PercentDNCC -616.4** 20013* 
 [142] [12055] 
   
PercentCGQuart -750.5** 1185 
 [44.9] [1466] 
   
PercentDNCG 721.3** 5157* 
 [73.4] [2618] 
   
PercentCNQuart -943.5** 35864** 
 [120] [12395] 
   
PercentDNCN 553.8** 6353 
 [166] [25700] 
   
PercentCOQuart -110.3 -48472* 
 [128] [23889] 
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PercentDNCO 2694** -14398 
 [260] [9718] 
   
PercentFFQuart -1006** -228.1 
 [31.4] [295] 
   
PercentDNFF 95.64* -1088 
 [39.2] [752] 
   
PercentMUEQuart -586.7** 858.7 
 [39.8] [2995] 
   
PercentDNMUE 174.2** -6057** 
 [51.9] [1950] 
   
PercentPFQuart -982.1** -2599 
 [46.7] [1743] 
   
PercentDNPF -914.2** 1353 
 [78.6] [2133] 
   
PercentPOSQuart -428.7** 2824** 
 [36.1] [827] 
   
PercentDNPOS -543.5** -4936** 
 [49.4] [1308] 
   
PercentRRFUQuart -1498** -860.9** 
 [28.5] [281] 
   
PercentDNRRFU 285.4** -879.5 
 [40.4] [758] 
   
Constant 223897** 688129** 
 [3859] [73137] 
   
Observations 168123 6611 
R-squared 0.67 0.65 
 
 
XXI. APPENDIX 9 
REGRESSION SET 2 
 
 (1) (2) 
COEFFICIENT URBAN RURAL 
   
area 0.00000299** 0.00000181** 
 [0.000000058] [0.000000032] 
   
areaSQ -0** -0** 
 [0] [0] 
   
bldgsqft 0.000148** 0.000119** 
 [0.00000072] [0.0000074] 
   
bldgsqftSQ -6.89e-10** -3.56e-09** 
128 
 [0] [1.23e-09] 
   
distdowntown -0.00000289** -0.0000142** 
 [0.00000019] [0.0000019] 
   
disDTSQ 0** 0** 
 [0] [0] 
   
distfreeart 0.00000616** -0.00000209 
 [0.00000096] [0.0000026] 
   
disfreeartSQ -1.95e-09** 0 
 [1.07e-10] [1.33e-10] 
   
disthospital 0.00000484** 0.000000908 
 [0.00000035] [0.0000015] 
   
dishospitalSQ 0* -0 
 [0] [0] 
   
distrivers 0.000000979* -0.00000268 
 [0.00000043] [0.0000029] 
   
disriversSQ 1.47e-10** 1.17e-10 
 [0] [1.32e-10] 
   
distschools 0.0000297** 0.0000265** 
 [0.0000010] [0.0000030] 
   
disschoolsSQ -1.78e-09** -8.64e-10** 
 [8.93e-11] [1.06e-10] 
   
distUGBdistance -0.0000184** -0.000000550 
 [0.00000074] [0.0000012] 
   
disUGBSQ 7.28e-11** 0 
 [0] [0] 
   
elevation 0.000536** 0.000127** 
 [0.0000064] [0.000018] 
   
UGB -0.0106 -0.133** 
 [0.010] [0.021] 
   
Y1970 -1.858** - 
 [0.30] - 
   
Y1971 -2.365** - 
 [0.21] - 
   
Y1972 -2.290** - 
 [0.11] - 
   
Y1973 -2.004** - 
 [0.17] - 
   
Y1974 -1.816** - 
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 [0.21] - 
   
Y1975 -1.606** - 
 [0.30] - 
   
Y1976 -2.384** - 
 [0.15] - 
   
Y1977 -2.030** - 
 [0.15] - 
   
Y1978 -1.429** -1.645** 
 [0.017] [0.13] 
Y1979 -1.330** -1.526** 
 [0.015] [0.14] 
Y1980 -1.308** -1.556** 
 [0.017] [0.17] 
Y1981 -1.266** -1.423** 
 [0.019] [0.11] 
Y1982 -1.253** -1.305** 
 [0.022] [0.14] 
Y1983 -1.375** -1.432** 
 [0.014] [0.088] 
Y1984 -1.372** -1.359** 
 [0.013] [0.068] 
Y1985 -1.420** -1.479** 
 [0.011] [0.072] 
Y1986 -1.399** -1.402** 
 [0.0079] [0.051] 
Y1987 -1.358** -1.402** 
 [0.0081] [0.048] 
Y1988 -1.340** -1.321** 
 [0.0069] [0.045] 
Y1989 -1.073** -1.072** 
 [0.0064] [0.047] 
Y1990 -1.112** -1.020** 
 [0.0060] [0.033] 
Y1991 -1.043** -0.979** 
 [0.0061] [0.034] 
Y1992 -0.936** -0.999** 
 [0.0054] [0.034] 
Y1993 -0.895** -0.918** 
 [0.0049] [0.030] 
Y1994 -0.760** -0.806** 
 [0.0047] [0.029] 
Y1995 -0.647** -0.711** 
 [0.0047] [0.027] 
Y1996 -0.574** -0.591** 
 [0.0042] [0.026] 
Y1997 -0.467** -0.511** 
 [0.0040] [0.025] 
Y1998 -0.440** -0.465** 
 [0.0038] [0.023] 
Y1999 -0.390** -0.428** 
 [0.0037] [0.024] 
Y2000 -0.364** -0.415** 
 [0.0037] [0.024] 
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Y2001 -0.325** -0.406** 
 [0.0034] [0.023] 
Y2002 -0.293** -0.355** 
 [0.0033] [0.022] 
Y2003 -0.234** -0.304** 
 [0.0031] [0.021] 
Y2004 -0.129** -0.157** 
 [0.0029] [0.019] 
LUMFRdummy -0.0941**  
 [0.012]  
   
PercentSFRnot123Quart -0.00169** 0.00138 
 [0.00010] [0.00090] 
   
PercentDNSFRnot123 -0.00338** -0.00137 
 [0.00017] [0.0019] 
   
PercentMFRQuart -0.00210** -0.00224* 
 [0.00012] [0.0011] 
   
PercentDNMFR -0.0127** 0.0113** 
 [0.00021] [0.0038] 
   
PercentMURQuart -0.00289** 0.00418* 
 [0.00012] [0.0023] 
   
PercentDNMUR -0.00478** 0.00958 
 [0.00019] [0.0066] 
   
PercentINDUSTQuart -0.00373** -0.00571* 
 [0.00016] [0.0023] 
   
PercentDNINDUST -0.00314** 0.00578* 
 [0.00020] [0.0027] 
   
PercentCCQuart -0.00272** 0.804* 
 [0.00040] [0.44] 
   
PercentDNCC -0.00391** 0.0359 
 [0.00067] [0.027] 
   
PercentCGQuart -0.00345** -0.00871** 
 [0.00021] [0.0033] 
   
PercentDNCG 0.000987** 0.0145* 
 [0.00035] [0.0058] 
   
PercentCNQuart -0.00464** 0.0351 
 [0.00057] [0.028] 
   
PercentDNCN -0.00151* 0.115* 
 [0.00078] [0.057] 
   
PercentCOQuart -0.000332 -0.0505 
 [0.00060] [0.053] 
   
PercentDNCO 0.0151** -0.0346 
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 [0.0012] [0.022] 
   
PercentFFQuart -0.00294** -0.00167* 
 [0.00015] [0.00066] 
   
PercentDNFF -0.00270** 0.000292 
 [0.00018] [0.0017] 
   
PercentMUEQuart -0.00251** -0.00403 
 [0.00019] [0.0067] 
   
PercentDNMUE -0.00105** -0.00643 
 [0.00024] [0.0043] 
   
PercentPFQuart -0.00446** -0.0103** 
 [0.00022] [0.0039] 
   
PercentDNPF -0.00755** 0.00733 
 [0.00037] [0.0047] 
   
PercentPOSQuart -0.00129** 0.00660** 
 [0.00017] [0.0018] 
   
PercentDNPOS -0.00539** -0.0110** 
 [0.00023] [0.0029] 
   
PercentRRFUQuart -0.00569** -0.00365** 
 [0.00013] [0.00062] 
   
PercentDNRRFU -0.00144** 0.00216 
 [0.00019] [0.0017] 
   
LUAGRdummy  0.118** 
  [0.013] 
   
LUFORdummy  0.0117 
  [0.014] 
   
Constant 12.53** 13.21** 
 [0.018] [0.16] 
   
Observations 168123 6611 
R-squared 0.67 0.70 
Standard errors in brackets   
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